Analysis Arms Control after Ukraine: Integrated Arms Control and Deterring Two Peer CompetitorsByHeather Williams and Nicholas AdamopoulosPublished Dec 16, 2022This paper will first examine ways that the war in Ukraine may impact prospects for arms control, then pose first-order questions about future U.S. arms control policy.
Analysis / ReportIntegrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic CompetitionByRebecca Hersman, Suzanne Claeys and Heather WilliamsPublished Jan 25, 2022Can contemporary arms control keep pace with the rapid rate of change in both geopolitics and technology? This study examines the implication and prospects for the future of arms control in a highly competitive security environment in which challenges from advanced technologies and diminished state control over processes of verification become increasingly prominent features, even as the scope and modalities of arms control grow more complex and multifaceted.
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityWeapons in the Hand of God: The Russian Orthodox Church and Russia’s Nuclear Weapons EstablishmentByAndrew HollisPublished Aug 16, 2019It was early September 1943. The Soviets had just won a major victory over the Germans in Stalingrad.
Analysis / CommentaryCSIS European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues: Consensus StatementByRebecca HersmanPublished Feb 22, 2019The European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Fondation pourla Recherche Stratégique (FRS), has convened senior nuclear policy experts from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States (P3) for the past ten years to discuss nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation policy issues and to identify areas of consensus among the three countries.
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityReflections on INF WithdrawalByAndrew ReddiePublished Feb 20, 2019Two weeks ago, the Trump administration announced that it intends to suspend its commitment to the INF Treaty and exercise Article XV of the Treaty. This article reflects on the significance of the treaty and what its suspension might mean for U.S. nuclear policy moving forward.
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityThe wrong response to Russia’s INF Treaty violationByAbigail Stowe-ThurstonPublished Sep 13, 2018In the latest response to Russian INF Treaty violations, the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act renews calls for the development of a new missile system. This provision will not only violate the INF Treaty but also put the United States on a poor footing with its European allies. Read previous PONI intern and 2018 Capstone…
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityThe Nuclear-powered Cruise Missile: Insights into Russian Strategic LogicByRyan KuhnsPublished Jun 15, 2018Putin’s surprising announcement that Russia had developed a nuclear-powered cruise missile provides important insight into Russian strategic logic and approaches to emerging technology.
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityTurkey’s Independent Defense Developments: Implications for NATOByTucker BoycePublished Jun 11, 2018Turkey is undergoing many political and economic changes, which puts stress on the country’s foreign relationships. In the defense sphere, Turkey is becoming more active in acquiring new technology. These defense sector changes have implications for Turkey’s relationship with NATO and other countries.
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityWhy Moscow Might Not Reveal an “Escalate to De-Escalate” StrategyByAlex Velez-GreenPublished May 8, 2018Concealing an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy could allow Russia to complicate U.S. and NATO policymaking more than revealing it and the absence of a formal doctrine might not prevent Moscow from attempting to “escalate to de-escalate” in a confrontation.
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunitySLCM’s Role in Deterring Regional AdversariesByAnthony MascaroPublished May 2, 2018Once the U.S. bomber force is vulnerable to a first strike by a regional adversary, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to deter that state. The most probable solution to this impending strategic dilemma would be to develop a nuclear-tipped SLCM.