Join NTI as Jill Hruby, NTI’s inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow, presents a new report that analyzes the technical characteristics, deployment schedule, and military objectives of the new Russian systems, using exclusively open-source information.
It was early September 1943. The Soviets had just won a major victory over the Germans in Stalingrad.
The European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Fondation pourla Recherche Stratégique (FRS), has convened senior nuclear policy experts from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States (P3) for the past ten years to discuss nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation policy issues and to identify areas of consensus among the three countries.
Two weeks ago, the Trump administration announced that it intends to suspend its commitment to the INF Treaty and exercise Article XV of the Treaty. This article reflects on the significance of the treaty and what its suspension might mean for U.S. nuclear policy moving forward.
In the latest response to Russian INF Treaty violations, the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act renews calls for the development of a new missile system. This provision will not only violate the INF Treaty but also put the United States on a poor footing with its European allies. Read previous PONI intern and 2018 Capstone Read More
Putin’s surprising announcement that Russia had developed a nuclear-powered cruise missile provides important insight into Russian strategic logic and approaches to emerging technology.
Turkey is undergoing many political and economic changes, which puts stress on the country’s foreign relationships. In the defense sphere, Turkey is becoming more active in acquiring new technology. These defense sector changes have implications for Turkey’s relationship with NATO and other countries.
The discussion will focus on U.S.-Russian information warfare and how we can learn lessons from the past.
Concealing an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy could allow Russia to complicate U.S. and NATO policymaking more than revealing it and the absence of a formal doctrine might not prevent Moscow from attempting to “escalate to de-escalate” in a confrontation.
Once the U.S. bomber force is vulnerable to a first strike by a regional adversary, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to deter that state. The most probable solution to this impending strategic dilemma would be to develop a nuclear-tipped SLCM.