The European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), has convened senior nuclear policy experts from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States (P3) for the past nine years to discuss nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation policy issues and to identify areas of consensus among the three countries.
Putin’s surprising announcement that Russia had developed a nuclear-powered cruise missile provides important insight into Russian strategic logic and approaches to emerging technology.
Turkey is undergoing many political and economic changes, which puts stress on the country’s foreign relationships. In the defense sphere, Turkey is becoming more active in acquiring new technology. These defense sector changes have implications for Turkey’s relationship with NATO and other countries.
The discussion will focus on U.S.-Russian information warfare and how we can learn lessons from the past.
Concealing an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy could allow Russia to complicate U.S. and NATO policymaking more than revealing it and the absence of a formal doctrine might not prevent Moscow from attempting to “escalate to de-escalate” in a confrontation.
In a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Baltic region, the risks of escalation leading to nuclear use—deliberately, inadvertently, or accidentally—would be dangerously high. Ulrich Kühn argues that in order to combat these risks effectively, NATO must address the full range of the potential threats posed by Russia.
A collection of analysis pieces on the Trump Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review compiled by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).
The NPT nuclear five lack shared norms of nuclear behavior. Pursuing a nuclear code of conduct could resolve that and help increase both dialogue and stability.
The risk of a nuclear war is rising because of growing non-nuclear threats to nuclear weapons and their command-and-control systems. In a conventional war, such “entanglement” could lead to non-nuclear operations inadvertently threatening the opponent’s nuclear deterrent or being misinterpreted as preparations for nuclear use, potentially sparking catastrophic escalation. Alexey Arbatov, who co-authored a new Carnegie volume, Entanglement: Chinese and Russian Perspectives on Non-nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, will give a Russian view of this problem and present potential policy options in a conversation with James Acton.
At 10:00 am on December 8—the 30th anniversary of the INF treaty’s signing—the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative will hold a panel discussion on the treaty and its future. The panel will include Olga Oliker, senior advisor at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Brookings nonresident senior fellow Steven Pifer and Brookings senior fellow Strobe Talbott. Brookings fellow Alina Polyakova will moderate.