Two weeks ago, the Trump administration announced that it intends to suspend its commitment to the INF Treaty and exercise Article XV of the Treaty. This article reflects on the significance of the treaty and what its suspension might mean for U.S. nuclear policy moving forward.
Putin’s surprising announcement that Russia had developed a nuclear-powered cruise missile provides important insight into Russian strategic logic and approaches to emerging technology.
Turkey is undergoing many political and economic changes, which puts stress on the country’s foreign relationships. In the defense sphere, Turkey is becoming more active in acquiring new technology. These defense sector changes have implications for Turkey’s relationship with NATO and other countries.
The discussion will focus on U.S.-Russian information warfare and how we can learn lessons from the past.
Concealing an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy could allow Russia to complicate U.S. and NATO policymaking more than revealing it and the absence of a formal doctrine might not prevent Moscow from attempting to “escalate to de-escalate” in a confrontation.
The European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), has convened senior nuclear policy experts from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States (P3) for the past nine years to discuss nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation policy issues and to identify areas of consensus among the three countries.
A collection of analysis pieces on the Trump Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review compiled by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).
The NPT nuclear five lack shared norms of nuclear behavior. Pursuing a nuclear code of conduct could resolve that and help increase both dialogue and stability.
A report examining the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs in the former Soviet Union, including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.
The prospect of the demise of U.S.-Russian bilateral arms control is a gloomy one. But the problem will not be improved by ignoring it.