On January 5—amidst quickly escalating tensions between the United States and Iran—Tehran announced its latest steps to walk back its commitments to the 2015 nuclear deal.
Kim Jong Un has done a good job keeping the United States guessing about his next nuclear provocation. North Korea had threatened that it would pursue a more hardline “new path” by the end of last year unless the United States dropped its “hostile” policies toward the country.
It was early September 1943. The Soviets had just won a major victory over the Germans in Stalingrad.
As increasingly capable and provocative situational awareness tools come into play, the very act of improving situational awareness may intensify escalation cycles in unanticipated ways, particularly among nuclear-armed states.
As we survey the world today, we find the nuclear landscape to be more uncertain and precarious than it has been at any time since the end of the Cold War.
Iran’s nuclear actions so far do not merit a redline or the military response that could follow, nor do they rise to the level of an unacceptable threat to the United States or its interests. Rather, they are a signal that, although some in the Trump administration believe otherwise, Iran will not consent to being pushed via sanctions without seeking leverage of its own.
Iran announced Monday—and international inspectors confirmed—that it had exceeded the amount of enriched uranium it can have on hand under the terms of the nuclear deal (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA). The deal allows Iran to have up to 300kg of up to 3.67 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride.
ERIC BREWER and RICHARD NEPHEW
If the United States is to consider a more aggressive counterproliferation strategy, it must occur beyond the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative.
President Trump leverages hegemonic masculinities to exercise power in pursuit of his political agenda. How does this affect U.S. nuclear policy and what does it mean for the future of arms control?