The papers included in this volume comprise research from participants in the 2020 Nuclear Scholars Initiative and the PONI Conference Series. These papers explore such topics as the impacts of emerging technologies and capabilities, deep-diving on nuclear strategy and national policies, proposing paths forward for addressing proliferation challenges, and enhancing arms control in contentious environments.
The primary driver of Russia’s hypersonic build-up seems to be missile defense. President Putin said the development of these weapons was directly caused by the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.
In the Smirnov case, the irretrievable loss limit for the facility was set unusually high at 3% of the facility’s nuclear material. In total, Smirnov siphoned off 1.5 kg of HEU, representing only 1% of the facility’s material.
In short, there are really two key issues related to Iran’s ballistic missiles, not one. Although there are few easy answers to either of these, a proper framing is an essential starting point to open up a broader set of ideas and potential solutions.
Tough negotiations to save the Iranian nuclear deal are resuming, and they are by no means guaranteed to succeed.
Denuclearization Is Probably Out of Reach for Now—but It Might Be Possible to Reduce the Nuclear Threat
This is part 2 of the two-part series discussing theories and evidence on whether the NPT has Limited the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.
Winding back Iran’s nuclear program and Trump-era sanctions won’t be easy.
Despite evidence that the NPT has been helpful in restraining proliferation, there is still work to be done to understand how and why the NPT continues to work and under what conditions it may no longer work.
The debate on the direction of Iran’s nuclear program is a multifaceted puzzle which will continue to draw attention for the foreseeable future. Will Iran cross the threshold and weaponize its decades long nuclear program?