The Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) as India’s Bid for Conventional Deterrence

Introduction

As an increasing number of conflicts and intensifying geopolitical tensions continue to rise throughout the world, nations are reinvesting in and restructuring their security architectures. One notable observation from the conflicts in Ukraine and those in the Middle East is a heavy reliance on missile arsenals from all sides involved. There are several advantages to using missiles that have led to their proliferation in warfare, including their  relatively lower cost when compared to using manned aircraft, range, and ability to inflict persistent cost. This. This new age of missile renaissance has given small state and non-state actors an effective weapon to fight against larger powers, and it is now also prompting nuclear powers like India to reinvest in analogous and hybrid strategies rather than just being reliant on nuclear deterrence. India’s Integrated Rocket Force is a step in that direction.

Deterrence

Thomas Schelling offered one of the pioneering definitions of deterrence in his “Strategy of Conflict” (1960), which is compelling adversaries not to take certain actions by imposing a credible fear of unparalleled consequences. Deterrence defers from the concept of defence; Before him Glenn Snyder in his “Deterrence by Denial and Punishment” (1959) had defined deterrence as the strategy to prevent aggression from happening in the first place by threatening damage through retaliation, whereas defence constitutes measures to reduce or repel the aggression.

Nuclear Deterrence – Past & Present

Since its inception, nuclear weapons have greatly changed and shaped the modern concept of deterrence. Mearsheimer rightly explains the difference between conventional and nuclear deterrence. Conventional deterrence is largely a function of military strategy and has comparatively little political involvement, which is not the case with nuclear deterrence. The main objective of nuclear deterrence is to prevent adversary from taking certain action by threatening to inflict massive nuclear retaliation. How a nation retaliates with nuclear weapons depends on their nuclear doctrines.

As the Cold War reached its breaking point, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) theory began to shape the parameters of nuclear deterrence. The result was a state of power parity. This has been called the nuclear peace. Since the Cold War, nuclear deterrence has been viewed as the ultimate deterrent.

However, the world is experiencing a rising trend of geopolitical conflict and tensions involving major nuclear powers such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel-Iran proxy war and Chinese aggression over Taiwan. Nuclear risk is particularly present in South Asia, where India and Pakistan have border tensions, with ever increasing Chinese involvement in the backdrop. These developments have subsequent consequences—instability of the state, be it political or security related, political pathologies that national leadership may have while dealing with nuclear escalation , faulty command and control structures that guards the nuclear arsenal , and strategic ambiguity that a nation might have or choose to have in their nuclear doctrine—may threaten the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Therefore, even nuclear-armed nations have to more heavily invest in conventional capabilities, as nuclear weapons can neither fully deter aggression, nor can be they employed in limited conventional conflicts. This is particularly evident with India, a nation that despite having a credible nuclear triad at its disposal, cannot seems to deter proxy wars and even open aggression from adversaries.

India’s dilemma

Since the late 1990s, India has adopted and followed the No First Use (NFU) policy for its nuclear weapons, which means India will only use nuclear weapons as a response to nuclear attack. It is an assuring measure to establish nuclear peace with its two nuclear neighbours. Pakistan, however, has not incorporated the NFU and instead made it clear that it will use nuclear weapons for both conventional and nuclear aggression against Pakistan. Naturally, it is directed towards India to deter India’s conventional superiority against Pakistan. When it comes to China, the PRC has maintained NFU for a long time, though in recent times there have been fewer mentions of it in PLA white papers. Compared to India, China enjoys both a conventional power advantage and a larger nuclear force.

Combining these two scenarios, India finds itself at a disadvantage. It cannot utilise its conventional superiority against Pakistan due to Pakistan’s aggressive nuclear doctrine, and New Delhi also cannot deter China’s conventional advantage properly due to India’s NFU commitment. In recent times, China has emerged as a bigger threat to India’s national security, as New Delhi views Beijing as strategic competition that has economic and military superiority. Recent clashes at Galwan and Doklam reaffirm India’s concerns.

IRF

In order to address conventional strategic challenges that India is facing, New Dehi has established the Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) to enhance a non-contact warfare capacity that will not only be cost-effective compared to heavy military deployments or air force involvement but will also provide surgical strike capabilities. The IRF will provide for deterrence by denial against Chinese threats. It will complement the ongoing trend of increasing automation and lowering human involvement in warfare. The IRF will act as a base force along with UAVs and other unmanned combat systems.

IRF – Structure & Future

In 2023, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) approved the acquisition of Pralay missiles; around 120 missiles are to be inducted with plans to induct 250 more. What makes Pralay so special are its unique configurations, especially its range, which falls between 150 and 500 km. This makes Pralay a non-strategic missile that does not violate strategic stability or risk asymmetric escalation. Pralay will provide an initial boost to the IRF and will act as a major conventional deterrent in highly localised conflicts across the Himalayan borders. In the coming future, IRF will also induct other types of missiles like BrahMos, LR-LACMs and, Nirbhay.

IRF could also lay claim to artillery rockets in the 250–300 km ranges from the army’s Pinaka multi-barrel launchers. However, there might be issues between IRF and tri-services about command and control regarding in-service projectiles and launchers. For example, if IRF forms its BrahMos missile batteries using important components of existing missile systems such as radars, launching platforms and especially command and control, then it would likely create a point of contention between the IRF and tri-services that are currently in control. Neither the army nor air force would be thrilled to let go of their command over these missile systems. Therefore, it is a better option for IRF to focus more on building its own arsenal. To ensure IRF’s precision strike capabilities, it will require, along with SRBMs, a substantial amount of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs). But as it goes for longer-range missiles, there can be a rising ambiguity about the nature of IRF, whether it is tactical or a comprehensive rocket force like China’s PLARF.

The difference between IRF and PLARF

The origins of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) date back to China’s longstanding strategy of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) which sought deterrence through punishment. PLARF, by controlling both conventional and nuclear missiles, creates ambiguity for the adversaries of China. Further, China has placed its tactical and strategic nuclear missiles at the same locations, which makes it difficult to assess which is which. This structure makes it difficult for China’s adversaries to launch conventional attacks without risking an escalation to the nuclear conflict . China can structure PLARF in such a way because the CPC has absolute control over nuclear power and its use for military applications. There is little to no civilian oversight when it comes to the matter of military and especially nuclear forces. India is unlikely to follow the same path as it prioritizes civilian control over nuclear arms. India also has components of Negative Control in its nuclear doctrine. Civilian institutions like the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) still play crucial role in custody and release procedures related to nuclear weapons.

The initial phase of the IRF will most likely focus on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to establish an effective counterweight deterrent to China’s PLARF and growing military presence; beyond that, it may also integrate the Line of Control (LOC) and the remaining border with Pakistan into its command. The IRF can also play a crucial role in the increasingly important Andaman and Nicobar Command.

However, before it can operate at an optimum level, IRF will need to sort out its command and control (C2) structure concerning three services. Many of IRF’s initial assets will come from the army and air force, and there appears to be concerns among Indian defence analysts about whether IRF will only control the missiles and rockets or the launching, communication, and intelligence systems that come with them as well. These challenges will need to be properly resolved before the upcoming theatersation of armed forces to maintain and streamline a reliable chain of command for rapid response.

Conclusion

The Integrated Rocket Force can act as a non-nuclear tactical deterrent against the rising threat from China. The IRF will bolster India’s A2/AD capabilities along the Himalayas and can become a more cost-effective method of deterrence if implemented with clear Command and Control. Coordination with the tri-services and streamlining of the chain of command are essential for IRF and will strengthen the theatre commands at large. Once operationalized at full capacity, IRF can expand its ambit and take command of a wider range of assets and areas.