Analysis / CommentaryRussia Suspends New START and Increases Nuclear RisksByHeather WilliamsPublished Feb 23, 2023The suspension of New START further contributes to the demise of arms control, and it also eliminates one of the few remaining forums for dialogue between Moscow and Washington at a time of rising nuclear risks.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityPart 2: How to Target Cancer and Security with Safe and Secure Radiation TechnologiesByPallabi Mitra, C. Norman Coleman and Manjit DosanjhPublished Jul 21, 2022Security and health have often been considered separate disciplines, but the rise in global terrorism has created an unintended intersection between both areas. Progress is being made by the international community in raising awareness of non-source-based technology options such as LINACs but there is more to be done in making non-source based technologies available to “cancer patients in LMICs and other geographically underserved regions.”
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityPart 1: How to Target Cancer and Security with Safe and Secure Radiation TechnologiesByPallabi MitraPublished May 24, 2022Part 1: Exploring a radiation therapy modality and the multifaceted challenges of source-based and non-source-based radiation technologies.
Analysis / External PublicationA Redline for Iran?ByEric BrewerPublished Dec 23, 2021Eric Brewer and Nicholas L. Miller explore Biden’s potential red lines when it comes to the expansion of the Iranian nuclear program.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityRussia’s New Nuclear Weapons: Understanding Avangard, Kinzhal, and TsirkonByAkshai VikramPublished Aug 2, 2021The primary driver of Russia’s hypersonic build-up seems to be missile defense. President Putin said the development of these weapons was directly caused by the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityLessons from a Real-Life Insider: The Case of Leonid SmirnoByNoelle CampPublished Jun 30, 2021In the Smirnov case, the irretrievable loss limit for the facility was set unusually high at 3% of the facility’s nuclear material. In total, Smirnov siphoned off 1.5 kg of HEU, representing only 1% of the facility’s material.
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityModernizing the Nuclear Enterprise in the Era of Rapid PrototypingByAndrew HunterPublished Nov 11, 2020The U.S. nuclear enterprise is going through a cycle of modernization that touches practically every system in the arsenal. This modernization push requires the nuclear enterprise to engage deeply with the defense acquisition system in a way it has not since its last major modernization cycle in the 1980s. Series Nuclear Nexus
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityPreventing Nuclear Risks in Outer SpaceByYukari SekiguchiPublished Jul 28, 2020Space is becoming an increasingly competitive domain and nuclear technologies, including both nuclear propulsion and energy production, could play a key role in advancing a variety of these missions.
Analysis / ReportDeep Dive Debrief: NC3: Challenges Facing the Future SystemByRebecca Hersman, Eric Brewer and Suzanne ClaeysPublished Jul 9, 2020This brief focuses on the emerging political, informational, and fiscal risks to the U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. Series Deep Dive Debrief
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityPreliminary Results from a Comparative Analysis of Counterintelligence and Insider Threat in Nuclear FacilitiesByNoelle CampPublished Jun 17, 2020Capstone presenter Noelle Camp presents a case for counterintelligence and insider threat in nuclear facilities.