Topic Nuclear Security

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A Choice of Nuclear Futures in Space 

In February, it was revealed that Russia has been developing a nuclear-armed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Officials quickly issued reassurances that the technology had not been deployed and that it did not pose an imminent danger. While it is still not publicly known how far Russia is in the development of this capability, the news nevertheless underscores that trends are pointing to a future in space that is nuclear. But whether this future will involve the weaponized use of nuclear power in space remains an open question. As the United States seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in space, it must do so with a clear vision for the sort of nuclear future it would like to see in space. This article examines three possible such futures and the questions on arms control, nonproliferation, and extended nuclear deterrence that arise from them.  

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Thinking about Vladimir Putin’s Thinking: Will He Push the Button? 

There are numerous reasons why it would seem unwise for Putin to deliberately use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. One can hope that he will come to this conclusion, or that his advisors will convince him of this very case. Still, it is important not to project one’s own framing of a situation onto the Kremlin and assume that it shares the same risk tolerance. Any potential costs of nuclear use must be weighed against the costs of non-use and the perceived benefits of use and take into consideration Putin’s risk propensity. There is simply a lot we do not know about Putin’s thought process and history is fraught with miscommunication and misunderstanding. This is by no means to suggest that Ukraine and its partners should concede to Putin. Supporting Ukraine is a just cause. However, the best path forward remains one that acknowledges the serious risks involved, strives to reduce nuclear tensions and reinforces the nuclear taboo.  

A New Nuclear Age?

As the United States enters a “new nuclear age,” the Pentagon’s approach is based on three assumptions: coordinated adversarial behavior, limited nuclear employment, and the failure of arms control. Despite some evidence, none should be considered forgone conclusions.

How to Get Away with a Nuclear Test

If Russia does return to nuclear testing, Putin will have assumed that the international community will be silent or divided on the issue—essentially, he would be betting that Russia can get away with it. But a return to nuclear testing, a well-recognized taboo, could backfire for Moscow.

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Countering Competitive Risk Compensation: Principles for Reducing Nuclear Risk on Net

In the context of strategic competition, efforts and interventions to reduce the risk of destructive nuclear or conventional conflict can change the incentives of leaders and institutions in ways that undermine risk reduction. As risk reduction is not the only objective that leaders may pursue, direct reductions in risk can accordingly embolden more aggressive behavior…

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