Analysis / Next Gen CommunityKeep it Secret, Keep it SafeByBerkley PelletierPublished May 21, 2025The past three decades have revealed troubling gaps in the safekeeping of U.S. nuclear secrets. While U.S. adversaries like China stand to gain from these lapses, the real threat comes from within.
Analysis / CommentaryWe Need More Off-Ramps for Nuclear CrisesByHeather Williams and Nicholas AdamopoulosPublished May 13, 2025States should develop off-ramps—such as crisis communications, third-party mediation, and narrative manipulation—now and in advance of crises in order to reduce the risk of nuclear use.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityThe Battlefield Above: Why the U.S. Must Enhance Deterrence to Prevent a Space War with ChinaByAlex Alfirraz ScheersPublished May 6, 2025 The United States’s ability to secure its vital interests is contingent on how effectively and credibly it deters China from space.
Analysis / ReportGame On: Opportunities for Euro-Atlantic Strategic Stability and Arms ControlByHeather Williams, Nicholas Adamopoulos, Lachlan Mackenzie and Catherine MurphyPublished Apr 23, 2025Europe is likely to remain a theater of instability despite pressure for a peace settlement in Ukraine. As the United States shifts toward the Indo-Pacific and Russia continues to pursue its territorial ambitions, what might arms control look like after the war in Ukraine?
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityThe Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) as India’s Bid for Conventional DeterrenceByMandar RansingPublished Feb 25, 2025Since its inception, nuclear deterrence has been viewed as the ultimate deterrence. Concepts like MAD ensured nuclear peace for many decades, but with the growing geopolitical tensions and conflicts involving nuclear states, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is being undermined. For India, it is concerning as it shares contested borders with two nuclear nations. Issues like nuclear doctrine and conventional asymmetry necessitate India strengthening its conventional deterrence. The Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) is a right step but needs clarity in the Command and Control (C2) structure. IRF in the future can expand its operations provided it gets sufficient firepower.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityMissile Defense of the ICBM Leg: A Step Towards a More Robust Strategic PostureByEli GlickmanPublished Jan 24, 2025Eli Glickman argues that advances in the Russian and Chinese ICBM forces (MIRVing, CEP reduction, etc.) are increasing the vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs. I draw on historical case studies to illustrate how point missile defense of ICBM fields is a feasible option to offset this challenge, as opposed to more expensive, controversial systems like a road-mobile Sentinel ICBM.
Analysis / CommentaryUpdating Nuclear Command, Control, and CommunicationByHeather WilliamsPublished Jan 3, 2025Nuclear command and control will be an essential piece of nuclear modernization plans. To confront two-peer competition, the United States should stay apace with modernization plans and will require constant innovation.
Analysis / CommentaryEscalation as a Path to Peace: Risk Tolerance and Negotiations in UkraineByLachlan MackenziePublished Jan 3, 2025The incoming President Donald Trump has made achieving a rapid, negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine a cornerstone of his foreign policy agenda. It is not clear, however, that the Kremlin sees a need to offer concessions.
Analysis / CommentaryWhy Striking Iranian Nuclear Facilities Is a Bad IdeaByDoreen HorschigPublished Oct 31, 2024Israeli military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities could escalate tensions and push Tehran further towards nuclear weapons development. Diplomacy, although slow, remains the only viable way to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityA Choice of Nuclear Futures in Space ByLuke WidenhousePublished Sep 30, 2024In February, it was revealed that Russia has been developing a nuclear-armed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Officials quickly issued reassurances that the technology had not been deployed and that it did not pose an imminent danger. While it is still not publicly known how far Russia is in the development of this capability, the news nevertheless underscores that trends are pointing to a future in space that is nuclear. But whether this future will involve the weaponized use of nuclear power in space remains an open question. As the United States seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in space, it must do so with a clear vision for the sort of nuclear future it would like to see in space. This article examines three possible such futures and the questions on arms control, nonproliferation, and extended nuclear deterrence that arise from them.