In the Smirnov case, the irretrievable loss limit for the facility was set unusually high at 3% of the facility’s nuclear material. In total, Smirnov siphoned off 1.5 kg of HEU, representing only 1% of the facility’s material.
About the Author
Noelle Camp is an Engineering Systems Professional in the Center for Global Security and Cooperation at Sandia National Laboratories. At Sandia, Noelle facilitates international workshops on sanctions enforcement and counterproliferation topics and conducts research on insider threat mitigation in nuclear facilities. Prior to coming to Sandia, Noelle gained experience in public and legislative affairs through internships with the Department of Defense, the Institute for the Study of War, and the Department of State at the U.S. Embassy Beijing. She is a 2019 Robertson Fellow and a recipient of the National Security Language Initiative for Youth (NSLI-Y) scholarship to pursue Chinese language study at Beijing Normal University. She holds a Master of International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a Bachelor of Arts in Global Politics from Washington and Lee University.
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Capstone presenter Noelle Camp presents a case for counterintelligence and insider threat in nuclear facilities.