Analysis Automating the OODA Loop in the Age of AIByJames JohnsonPublished Jul 25, 2022Because of the confluence of several cognitive, geopolitical, and organizational factors, the line between machines analyzing and synthesizing (i.e., prediction) data that informs humans who make decisions (i.e., judgment) will become an increasingly blurred human-machine decision-making continuum.
Analysis / ReportIntegrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic CompetitionByRebecca Hersman, Suzanne Claeys and Heather WilliamsPublished Jan 25, 2022Can contemporary arms control keep pace with the rapid rate of change in both geopolitics and technology? This study examines the implication and prospects for the future of arms control in a highly competitive security environment in which challenges from advanced technologies and diminished state control over processes of verification become increasingly prominent features, even as the scope and modalities of arms control grow more complex and multifaceted.
Analysis / ReportInfluence and Escalation: Implications of Russian and Chinese Influence Operations for Crisis ManagementByRebecca Hersman, Eric Brewer, Maxwell Simon and Lindsey SheppardPublished Nov 17, 2021As influence operations increasingly engage strategic-level interests, capabilities, and risks—U.S. infrastructure, institutions, elites, or those of our close allies—existing assumptions about their escalatory potential may not prove sound.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityRussia’s New Nuclear Weapons: Responding To The ProblemByAkshai VikramPublished Sep 27, 2021While terrifying in their own right, the Russian hypersonic systems discussed here only underscore the threat of nuclear conflict – a threat that has existed for decades. They exacerbate existing dangers, sometimes in intriguing ways, but do not fundamentally reshape the seemingly always perilous U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityLessons from a Real-Life Insider: The Case of Leonid SmirnoByNoelle CampPublished Jun 30, 2021In the Smirnov case, the irretrievable loss limit for the facility was set unusually high at 3% of the facility’s nuclear material. In total, Smirnov siphoned off 1.5 kg of HEU, representing only 1% of the facility’s material.
Analysis / CommentarySurveillance, Situational Awareness, and Warning at the Conventional-Strategic InterfaceByRebecca Hersman and Reja YounisPublished Jan 15, 2021The expansion of dual-capable delivery systems and the diversification of strategic forms of warfare to include cyber, space, and advanced high precision conventional strike capabilities have sharply eroded structural conventional-nuclear firebreaks firebreaks. Series Nuclear Nexus
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityLeft of Launch: Artificial Intelligence at the Nuclear NexusByLindsey SheppardPublished Dec 17, 2020The areas of AI application into the nuclear enterprise are far left of an operational decision or decision to launch and include four priority sectors: (1) security and defense; (2) intelligence activities and indications and warning; (3) modeling and simulation, optimization, and data analytics; and (4) logistics and maintenance. Series Nuclear Nexus
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityAdapting to the Hypersonic EraByIan WilliamsPublished Nov 2, 2020Conventional hypersonic strike weapons may undermine deterrence by complicating early-warning and increasing the vulnerability of forward-based forces to surprise attack below the nuclear threshold. Nevertheless, history shows that adaptation to strategically disruptive technologies is possible. Series Nuclear Nexus
Analysis / Commentary, Next Gen CommunityA Balance of Instability: Effects of a Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Weapons Ban on Nuclear StabilityByKaitlyn JohnsonPublished Oct 21, 2020How would new norms for testing space weapons affect nuclear stability and traditional deterrence? Would a direct-ascent ASAT limit or ban create stability or further destabilize the space and nuclear domains? Series Nuclear Nexus
Analysis / CommentaryWormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear AgeByRebecca HersmanPublished Jul 10, 2020Increasingly capable and intrusive digital information technologies, advanced dual-use military capabilities, and diffused global power structures will reshape future crises and conflicts between nuclear-armed adversaries and challenge traditional ways of thinking about escalation and stability. This emerging security environment will require new concepts and tools to manage the risk of unintended escalation and reduce nuclear dangers.