On September 18, pagers belonging to Hezbollah fighters began detonating across Lebanon following a joint Mossad-Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operation. The following day, a series of explosions targeted walkie-talkie equipment, completely dismantling Hezbollah’s low-tech communication lines, blinding up to 500 fighters, and injuring up to 3,000. As Hezbollah reeled from these attacks, the Israeli Air Force unleashed a powerful airstrike, hitting an underground command bunker beneath a Beirut neighborhood housing Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, along with seven high-ranking officials. In ten days, Israel decapitated Hezbollah as an organization, leaving behind only fighters previously deemed not important enough to have a beeper. Beyond a tactical operation, by electing to conduct all three operations in daylight, civilians in Lebanon and Iran were forced to confront Hezbollah’s weakness. Although these operations were transformative, this crippling of Hezbollah will likely send nuclear shockwaves through the region by incentivizing both Tehran’s nuclear weaponization and Israeli targeting of Iranian nuclear facilities. As the region braces for continued conflict between Israel and Iran after the U.S. election, rather than striking nuclear facilities, Israel should target economic centers of gravity, bolster influence operations, and leverage domestic unrest in Iran and Lebanon to destabilize the regime. At the same time, the U.S. should raise the political and economic costs of maintaining a nuclear program. This approach can foster democracy, enhance Mossad intelligence operations, and compel Iran to reallocate military financing, laying the groundwork for lasting peace. A Faulty Deterrent Iran operates within a triangular deterrence structure comprised of missile and drone technology, the so-called axis of resistance, and threats to weaponize its nuclear program. Hezbollah has been a foundational element of Iran’s proxy network by training regional Shi’a militants, forcing Israel to divert military resources during the Gaza conflict, and attacking as a front-line defense for Iran. Since Hezbollah expanded its arsenal after the 2006 Lebanon War, Tehran has utilized the group as a deterrent against direct attacks and a rapid-response force that can quickly mobilize on Iran’s behalf should an attack be devastating. Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian Civil War enhanced the group’s tactical and battlefield capabilities, posing a unique threat to Israel as the IDF began to withdraw soldiers from Syria in 2019. The growing strength of Iran’s regional proxies likely dampened Tehran’s desire to develop a nuclear warhead. In July 2024, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that despite increased uranium stockpiles and advanced centrifuge installations, the country has not yet resumed its nuclear program, only that it has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device if it chooses to do so.” Although Iran employs a hedging strategy, where it uses nuclear threats to obtain concessions from enemies, Israel’s dismantling of Hezbollah has demonstrated that proxies can be faulty insurance policies, and threats to weaponize alone are ineffective deterrents. Consequently, Iran will likely try to remedy this imbalance in its deterrence doctrine by publicly taking steps that increase uncertainty about its nuclear policy while privately taking actions that shorten breakout time. These actions will remain beneath the nuclear threshold to avoid further ostracization but will better position the country for weaponization at a more opportune moment. Potential policy revisions include putting Iran’s nuclear fatwa (religious decree against the state developing nuclear weapons) into question, boosting uranium enrichment to 90% (weapon-grade level), reducing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, or moving declared enrichment sites underground. Targeting Nuclear Facilities The decapitation of Hezbollah also makes Israel likely to target Iran’s nuclear sites while it is vulnerable. The Security Cabinet mulled attacks on Iranian nuclear sites while Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and various Cabinet members issued statements advocating for a strike on nuclear sites. On October 26, Israel decimated Iran’s integrated air defense network and radar sites, including all four S-300 antimissile batteries, which are vital to protecting Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow, according to the Institute for Science and International Security’s previous satellite imagery. The White House often responds with a bear hug, publicly declaring “ironclad support” but privately expressing clear restrictions and occasionally issuing statements emphasizing proportionality of force. President Biden stated that he opposes a potential Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear program and expressed concern about attacks on energy infrastructure as well as triggering a broader war in the Middle East. Prime Minister Netanyahu responded by stating that Israel will only strike Iran’s military sites, not nuclear or oil, but stressed that “we listen to the opinions of the United States, but we will make our final decisions based on our national interest.” Israeli attacks after the U.S. election on Iran’s nuclear program would likely involve sabotage of centrifuges, undeclared nuclear facilities, or nuclear research centers similar to those in July 2020, April 2021, and May 2022, rather than direct strikes on Iranian declared nuclear sites. This is primarily due to Iran’s ongoing relocation of Fordow and Nantanz nuclear facilities underground, posing a challenge for Israel, which lacks the capability to strike these hardened nuclear sites. Ahead of the recent hardening of sites, 2007 assessments note that Israel could destroy heavily hardened sites using three sequential BLU-113s, 2,000 lbs, carried by the F-15I Ra’am and F-16I Sufa. However, today, Israel would require a U.S. GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), 30,000 lbs, along with bombers that could drop it, as currently, the F-15I Ra’am has the largest payload at 23,000 lbs. Due to humanitarian concerns, the U.S. has refused to provide MOPs or lease B-2 fighter jets that can drop the bombs. After the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), international attempts to sabotage Iran’s nuclear facilities have become increasingly futile. The agreement provided protection, which allowed Iran to acquire extensive indigenous knowledge on procurement strategies, stockpiling, and technological expertise that assassinations or strikes on facilities cannot eliminate. Proponents of sustaining the norm of cyber-attacks, direct strikes on nuclear facilities, and assassinations of nuclear scientists, including former President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu, overlook that these attacks will prompt Iran to rapidly shift existing stockpiles to covert enrichment facilities, restrict IAEA access, and potentially even reassess weaponization. Policy Recommendations The status quo of targeting Iranian nuclear and military sites in tit-for-tat attacks fails to threaten what the regime values most: maintaining its hold on power. A more effective Israeli and U.S. non-proliferation policy would involve bolstering domestic opposition in Lebanon and Iran through concerted information campaigns, supporting dissident groups, and targeting economic centers of power. This approach would weaken the regime and create conditions for future civilian-led efforts to restore democracy to both countries while preventing future weaponization, proxy expansion, and continued bloodshed. The success of Mossad’s operations to dismantle Hezbollah in Lebanon stems from widespread public frustration with corrupt leadership that prioritizes terrorism, foreign wars, and weapons of mass destruction amid rampant corruption, poverty, and civil repression in Iran and Lebanon. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has subtly called for collaboration with the public on intelligence sharing and covert operations by releasing videos directly addressing the citizens of Iran and Lebanon on September 30and October 8. Still, Israel could go a step further by covertly providing intelligence and financial support to Iranian opposition groups advocating for an end to the regime. Apart from weakening the regime while Iran remains beneath the nuclear threshold, groups could provide Mossad with information on domestic unrest in Iran, which could be helpful in future coordinated information campaigns. Israel could complement these intelligence operations tactically by targeting gas, electricity, and oil in ways that hinder domestic supply within Iran without crippling the global oil market. For example, in November 2020, October 2021, and December 2023, Israeli hacking groups believed to have links with the government paralyzed gas and train stations across the country, once even putting the office phone number of the Supreme Leader as the number to call for information. Alternatively, as an Atlantic Council report suggests, Israel could target specific oil refineries, such as Abadan, which accounts for a quarter of Iran’s domestic gas supply but would not impact international markets or crude oil exports since the production serves the domestic market. Regardless of the attack method, these attacks are effective mechanisms to humiliate the regime, paralyze domestic markets, and reduce trust in the Supreme Leader without indiscriminately hurting civilians or disturbing international oil prices. U.S. policymakers could bolster these messages and military actions by raising the political and economic costs for Iran to maintain its nuclear program. To increase the political cost, the State Department should empower Iranian human rights organizations, particularly ones that can document human rights abuses, while simultaneously supporting platforms for expatriated Iranian dissidents and women’s rights activists to speak out against the regime. Additionally, the Treasury Department should ease restrictions on Starlink beyond the 2022 decision to provide uncensored internet access, enhancing freedom of information and communication for opposition groups. To raise the economic cost, the Treasury Department must reinforce the existing sanctions regime, particularly targeting Iranian oil and petrochemical exports. As documented by the Atlantic Council, China bypasses Western sanctions by importing Iranian oil using dark fleet tankers, which can avoid detection while sending payments through small Chinese banks. In the first quarter of 2024, Iran sold an average of 1.56 million barrels daily, the highest level since the third quarter of 2018, with 90 percent of oil exports going directly to China. The Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act currently in the Senate is one pathway to achieve this by expanding sanctions to cover Chinese financial institutions purchasing Iranian petroleum and establishing an annual determination process to prohibit U.S. businesses from engaging with these financial institutions. Additionally, the White House, after the 2024 election, should release a joint statement with Britain, France, and Germany to unequivocally convey to Iran that they will not permit the snapback sanctions mechanism to expire in October 2025 if nuclear advancements persist. Taking these actions will undermine the Supreme Leader’s grip on domestic power and the Iranian regime’s influence in the region, offering a more effective safeguard against a nuclear Iran than a limited military strike.