The European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), has convened senior nuclear policy experts from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States (P3) for the past nine years to discuss nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation policy issues and to identify areas of consensus among the three countries.
The Carnegie Endowment invites you to join over 800 experts and officials from more than forty-five countries and international organizations to debate—and explore solutions for—the most pressing challenges in nuclear deterrence, arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation, energy, and security.
The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies invites you to: Mitchell Nuclear Deterrence Series – A Review of Middle East and East Asian Missile Threats: Iran and North Korea Connections
This discussion will focus on diplomatic efforts to restrain the separate nuclear challenges posed by North Korea and Iran.
The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies invites you to: Mitchell Nuclear Deterrence Series – Nuclear and Missile Proliferation: China, Iran, and North Korea
A serious Iran strategy must identify the priority threats that must be stopped, even as other threats are addressed.
An annual report produced by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on the current state of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation policies and initiatives.
A country-by-country breakdown produced by the Arms Control Association on the state of past and current arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that each state has or has not subscribed to. The profiles also describe the primary weapons programs, policies, and proliferation record of each country.
While it is often difficult to parse reasonable criticisms from Iran’s standard litany of anti-U.S. rhetoric, complaints that the United States is not upholding its end of the deal are not entirely unfounded. It has long been understood that the bulk of the new trade and investment that Iran could expect under the JCPOA would not come from the United States, given the extensive web of U.S. sanctions that would remain in place, but from Europe, Russia, and China.
After sixteen months of negotiations, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached April 2, 2015 is an exceptional milestone in the thirty-six years of fraught relations between the West and the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, according to a statement delivered by President Obama outlining the JCPOA, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” and plenty of hazards exist along the way to reaching an eventual comprehensive agreement by the current talks’ stated deadline of June 30th.