Analysis / CommentaryWhy Striking Iranian Nuclear Facilities Is a Bad IdeaByDoreen HorschigPublished Oct 31, 2024Israeli military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities could escalate tensions and push Tehran further towards nuclear weapons development. Diplomacy, although slow, remains the only viable way to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityA Choice of Nuclear Futures in Space ByLuke WidenhousePublished Sep 30, 2024In February, it was revealed that Russia has been developing a nuclear-armed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Officials quickly issued reassurances that the technology had not been deployed and that it did not pose an imminent danger. While it is still not publicly known how far Russia is in the development of this capability, the news nevertheless underscores that trends are pointing to a future in space that is nuclear. But whether this future will involve the weaponized use of nuclear power in space remains an open question. As the United States seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in space, it must do so with a clear vision for the sort of nuclear future it would like to see in space. This article examines three possible such futures and the questions on arms control, nonproliferation, and extended nuclear deterrence that arise from them.
Analysis / CommentaryWhy Russia Is Changing Its Nuclear Doctrine NowByHeather WilliamsPublished Sep 27, 2024Putin’s changes Russia’s nuclear doctrine show increased reliance on nuclear weapons for coercion in the Ukraine War. By expanding nuclear use conditions, Russia aims to deter Western aid and divide European allies, signaling a greater willingness to escalate.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityThinking about Vladimir Putin’s Thinking: Will He Push the Button? ByLinde DesmaelePublished Sep 4, 2024There are numerous reasons why it would seem unwise for Putin to deliberately use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. One can hope that he will come to this conclusion, or that his advisors will convince him of this very case. Still, it is important not to project one’s own framing of a situation onto the Kremlin and assume that it shares the same risk tolerance. Any potential costs of nuclear use must be weighed against the costs of non-use and the perceived benefits of use and take into consideration Putin’s risk propensity. There is simply a lot we do not know about Putin’s thought process and history is fraught with miscommunication and misunderstanding. This is by no means to suggest that Ukraine and its partners should concede to Putin. Supporting Ukraine is a just cause. However, the best path forward remains one that acknowledges the serious risks involved, strives to reduce nuclear tensions and reinforces the nuclear taboo.
Analysis / CommentaryA New Nuclear Age?ByReja YounisPublished Aug 20, 2024As the United States enters a “new nuclear age,” the Pentagon’s approach is based on three assumptions: coordinated adversarial behavior, limited nuclear employment, and the failure of arms control. Despite some evidence, none should be considered forgone conclusions.
Analysis / CommentaryThe Israel-Hamas Conflict: Implications for Nuclear Security in the RegionByDoreen HorschigPublished Jan 11, 2024The Israel-Hamas conflict strains Israel-Iran ties, impacting regional nuclear dynamics. It may strengthen Israel’s resolve to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, prompt Iran’s nuclear acceleration, and hinder U.S.-Iran diplomacy.
Analysis / CommentaryHow to Get Away with a Nuclear TestByHeather WilliamsPublished Nov 17, 2023If Russia does return to nuclear testing, Putin will have assumed that the international community will be silent or divided on the issue—essentially, he would be betting that Russia can get away with it. But a return to nuclear testing, a well-recognized taboo, could backfire for Moscow.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityCountering Competitive Risk Compensation: Principles for Reducing Nuclear Risk on NetByMatthew GentzelPublished Nov 13, 2023In the context of strategic competition, efforts and interventions to reduce the risk of destructive nuclear or conventional conflict can change the incentives of leaders and institutions in ways that undermine risk reduction. As risk reduction is not the only objective that leaders may pursue, direct reductions in risk can accordingly embolden more aggressive behavior…
Analysis / CommentaryRussia Suspends New START and Increases Nuclear RisksByHeather WilliamsPublished Feb 23, 2023The suspension of New START further contributes to the demise of arms control, and it also eliminates one of the few remaining forums for dialogue between Moscow and Washington at a time of rising nuclear risks.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityPart 2: How to Target Cancer and Security with Safe and Secure Radiation TechnologiesByPallabi Mitra, C. Norman Coleman and Manjit DosanjhPublished Jul 21, 2022Security and health have often been considered separate disciplines, but the rise in global terrorism has created an unintended intersection between both areas. Progress is being made by the international community in raising awareness of non-source-based technology options such as LINACs but there is more to be done in making non-source based technologies available to “cancer patients in LMICs and other geographically underserved regions.”