Topic Nuclear Security

The Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) as India’s Bid for Conventional Deterrence

Since its inception, nuclear deterrence has been viewed as the ultimate deterrence. Concepts like MAD ensured nuclear peace for many decades, but with the growing geopolitical tensions and conflicts involving nuclear states, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is being undermined. For India, it is concerning as it shares contested borders with two nuclear nations. Issues like nuclear doctrine and conventional asymmetry necessitate India strengthening its conventional deterrence. The Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) is a right step but needs clarity in the Command and Control (C2) structure. IRF in the future can expand its operations provided it gets sufficient firepower.

Missile Defense of the ICBM Leg: A Step Towards a More Robust Strategic Posture

Eli Glickman argues that advances in the Russian and Chinese ICBM forces (MIRVing, CEP reduction, etc.) are increasing the vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs. I draw on historical case studies to illustrate how point missile defense of ICBM fields is a feasible option to offset this challenge, as opposed to more expensive, controversial systems like a road-mobile Sentinel ICBM.

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A Choice of Nuclear Futures in Space 

In February, it was revealed that Russia has been developing a nuclear-armed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Officials quickly issued reassurances that the technology had not been deployed and that it did not pose an imminent danger. While it is still not publicly known how far Russia is in the development of this capability, the news nevertheless underscores that trends are pointing to a future in space that is nuclear. But whether this future will involve the weaponized use of nuclear power in space remains an open question. As the United States seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in space, it must do so with a clear vision for the sort of nuclear future it would like to see in space. This article examines three possible such futures and the questions on arms control, nonproliferation, and extended nuclear deterrence that arise from them.  

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Thinking about Vladimir Putin’s Thinking: Will He Push the Button? 

There are numerous reasons why it would seem unwise for Putin to deliberately use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. One can hope that he will come to this conclusion, or that his advisors will convince him of this very case. Still, it is important not to project one’s own framing of a situation onto the Kremlin and assume that it shares the same risk tolerance. Any potential costs of nuclear use must be weighed against the costs of non-use and the perceived benefits of use and take into consideration Putin’s risk propensity. There is simply a lot we do not know about Putin’s thought process and history is fraught with miscommunication and misunderstanding. This is by no means to suggest that Ukraine and its partners should concede to Putin. Supporting Ukraine is a just cause. However, the best path forward remains one that acknowledges the serious risks involved, strives to reduce nuclear tensions and reinforces the nuclear taboo.  

Header Image: Erin Stringer from the Evening Standard via Getty Images