Space is fast becoming a new battlefield. In an emerging era of great power competition, China poses a multidomain security threat to the United States. War in space has become a dangerous and genuine possibility. Consequently, the United States must respond to the growing multidomain Chinese threat by enhancing deterrence in space. The more adept China becomes at being able to credibly target American space capabilities, the more vulnerable the United States becomes to a devastating celestial attack. And the more vulnerable the United States’s celestial assets become, the greater the cost of war in space will be. In its 14th Five-Year Plan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) outlined its commitment to strengthening military capabilities in space. Enhancing space-based military capabilities aligns with President Xi Jinping’s vision of China as a dominant space power. President Xi considers superiority in space to be critical to securing vital interests. In September 2021, President Xi stated that ‘space is an important strategic asset for the country that must be well managed and utilised.’ Managed and utilised for hard power purposes. A 2023 Pentagon report on Chinese military and security developments states that the PRC’s space-based capabilities ‘increase China’s monitoring capabilities—including observation of US aircraft carriers, expeditionary strike groups, and deployed air wings. Space capabilities will enhance People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military operations farther from the Chinese coast.’ Furthermore, Chinese counterspace capabilities are continually evolving, and Beijing’s space strategy extends beyond intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and encompasses a range of kinetic assets that can be used to target and strike the United States in orbit, on land, air, and sea. Namely, operational space-based direct ascent capabilities are paired with ground-based space capabilities that can be employed for offensive and defensive purposes. For example, weapons systems such as anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles can destroy low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, striking targets at distances between 800 to 30,000 kilometres above Earth. Furthermore, the diversification and expansion program of China’s strategic weapons delivery systems indicates that it seeks to be a major military power in the space domain. ‘In July 2021, the PRC conducted its first fractional orbital launch of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with a hypersonic glide vehicle from China,’ states the Pentagon’s 2023 report. ‘This demonstrated the greatest distance flown (~40,000 kilometres) and longest flight time (~100+minutes) of any Chinese land attack weapons system to date.’ According to scholars Caitlin Talmadge and Joshua Rovner, the hypersonic glide vehicle tested in July 2021 was also nuclear-capable. However, they observe that there is no indication that a nuclear weapon was mounted atop the fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) used. Nevertheless, as Talmadge and Rovner portentously stated: ‘[while] China did not mount a nuclear weapon on the rocket in this test, it could do so in the future.’ Beijing is essentially enhancing its space capabilities to gain a strategic advantage over Washington. Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has also invested heavily in satellite technology that it claims can render the ocean transparent, thus potentially enabling China to target America’s deep-sea assets. China’s ISR capabilities have been significantly enhanced due to the development of its Death Star satellite. These capabilities can potentially be leveraged in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), putting US operations and assets at sea at risk. According to experts at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), China’s Death Star satellite is an orbital laser detection system that scans targeted areas at sea and has enhanced visibility capabilities, with penetration depths of up to 500 metres. Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) systems are not without their operational disadvantages. LIDAR lasers incur instant power loss when they hit the ocean’s surface. Various factors can negatively affect the efficacy of space-based laser systems, most notably weather conditions and oceanic currents, indicating that these systems are far from accurate or assured. Nevertheless, while these systems are not perfect, they are constantly subject to technological improvements, and such mechanisms are likely to be harnessed to maximise potential efficacy in the future. The United States’s ability to secure its vital interests is contingent on how effectively and credibly it deters China from space. Especially as space serves a critical role in the United States’s ability to function militarily. According to Greg Austin, Rajeswari Rajagopalan and Timothy Wright at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the United States relies on space for the following military capabilities: ISR; Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT); early warning of nuclear missile attack; environmental monitoring; and communications for command and control. In all, the United States has 137 military satellites in space—each critical to enabling the United States to maintain and fulfil its nuclear deterrence mission. The first domain affected by strategic nuclear war would be space, as ICBMs must leave Earth before re-entering the atmosphere to strike targets. Ballistic missile defence systems must intercept incoming strategic nuclear attacks in space. Therefore, collisions between military assets carrying nuclear warheads would wreak devastating consequences for both civilian and military assets in space. As the Strategic Posture Commission report states, ‘Chinese advances in offensive counterspace capabilities pose an increasingly serious threat to US and allied and partner space capabilities that enable US power projection, missile attack warning, and nuclear command and control,’ before recommending that ‘the United States should urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture and adopt offensive and defensive element to ensure US access to and operations in Space.’ The lack of transparency over its rapid nuclear expansion programme has exacerbated Washington’s distrust of Beijing. Should a nuclear crisis erupt over Taiwan, for example, space capabilities would be targeted, or worse, attacked. Hence, escalation to the nuclear level of war would affect and include space. Ensuring greater resilience in space is of paramount importance to the United States. Deterring in space also requires the United States to be bolder in its targeting policies. Ultimately, deterrence is about threatening to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary. Targeting China’s critical space assets and making it clear to the PRC that the United States would be ready to strike those assets, is a critical step toward enhancing deterrence in space. ‘War in space,’ Aaron Bateman warns, ‘would have far-reaching and catastrophic consequences.’ Beijing and Washington should heed his warning. Alex Alfirraz Scheers is a London-based defence analyst. He has a bachelor’s degree in War Studies and History and a master’s degree in National Security Studies from the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He was a finalist at the RUSI Project On Nuclear Issues Annual Conference 2024, has held research positions at the Henry Jackson Society and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. His works on nuclear strategy have been published by The Diplomat, Small Wars Journal, RealClearDefense and the Royal United Services Institute.