On May 7, 2025, India launched missile strikes in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. India stated that the strikes targeted terrorist infrastructure, while Pakistan rejected India’s claims. The strikes took place after two weeks of flare-ups between India and Pakistan following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, a town in India-administered Kashmir. Both countries adopted diplomatic and military measures in response to the situation, drawing international attention. India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire on May 10, after three days of military operations and as the countries stood on the precipice of war. The crisis between the two nuclear-armed countries indicates how rapidly tensions can escalate to dangerous levels. The intensity of the conflict exceeded that of past episodes, with several rounds of retaliation that undermined strategic stability in South Asia. This is also the first time India and Pakistan have engaged in drone warfare in their rivalry, indicating a new era of technological conflict in the region. The conflict underscores the need for heightened international attention to South Asia more broadly—not only during a crisis, as tensions over the Line of Control (LOC) occur even during relative peacetime. While the ceasefire continues to hold, the region should not reactively develop off-ramps only when tensions reach critical levels. The upcoming dialogues between India and Pakistan, as part of the ceasefire agreement, provide an opportunity for both countries to explore off-ramps and engage in confidence-building measures (CBMs). Q1: What happened in Pahalgam? A1: The terrorist attack took place on April 22 in Pahalgam, a town located in India-administered Kashmir, and killed 25 Indian citizens. The attack occurred along the LoC, which is a de facto border established in 1972 between India and Pakistan demarcating their control over Kashmir. India strongly condemned the terrorist attack, with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stating that those behind the attack will be brought to justice, and that India’s resolve to fight terrorism remains strong. Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement extending condolences to the family of the deceased and expressed concern about the loss of tourist lives. The Resistance Front (TRF) claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack. TRF is an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Kashmir-focused terrorist group that perpetrated the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, one of the deadliest attacks in India’s recent history. The United Nations and the United States have designated the LeT as an “international terrorist organization.” The LeT conducts activities in pursuit of a united Kashmir under Pakistan. The TRF has not conducted a large-scale attack before and is typically involved in LeT operations. Q2: What was Operation Sindoor, the military strikes launched by India? A2: Two weeks after the terrorist attack, India announced “Operation Sindoor” as a response to the Pahalgam attack, targeting what it terms as “terrorist infrastructure” in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. In its statement, the armed forces conducted conventional missile strikes. They also stated that none of the targeted sites were associated with the Pakistani military, but were linked to the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), another extremist group whose aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan and expel foreign troops from Afghanistan. India termed these strikes as “focused, measured, and non-escalatory.” In a briefing, Indian military officials stated that they will respond to any “misadventures” by Pakistan. Indian media reported that the precision strike weapons included SCALP cruise missiles and HAMMER precision-guided munitions, which were launched by the Rafale jets. Pakistan strongly criticized India’s actions, reporting 31 civilians killed and 46 wounded. The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs termed the missile strikes as an “act of war” violating Pakistan’s sovereignty. Pakistan reserved “the right to respond appropriately” at a time and place of its choosing and accused India of bringing the two nuclear-armed countries closer to a major conflict. Pakistan launched Operation Bunyanun Marsoos in response, during which Pakistan used precision-guided missiles and munitions in India and India-administered Kashmir against “enterprises that were responsible for fomenting terrorism in Pakistan.” India and Pakistan continued to engage in missile strikes. The conflict also saw India and Pakistan’s first-time engagement in drone warfare to target each other’s military bases. Q3: How have domestic and international stakeholders responded to the recent crisis? A3: Between April 22 and May 7, a series of regional and international responses took place. On the regional side, India announced a series of diplomatic measures, including the abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which supports the provision of water to both countries from the Indus River, the downgrading of diplomatic ties, and the suspension of trade. India accused Pakistan of failing to address terrorist activities. Pakistan continues to deny its involvement, claiming insubstantial evidence from India. It also adopted diplomatic measures, including threats to suspend the 1972 Shimla Agreement, which allows for bilateral resolution of disputes. In recent weeks, both countries conducted missile tests and shows of force. Pakistan conducted a test of the Fatah and Abdali surface-to-surface missiles. Hours before the strikes, India announced nationwide civil defense drills to prepare for a potential military conflict. Indian news sources reported that Prime Minister Modi provided the Indian armed forces a “free hand” to make operational decisions in crafting their response. India announced aerial drills, including the Rafales and Sukhois between May 7 and 8, while the missile strikes took place on May 7. Differing accounts emerge from Pakistan and India on their approaches to the conflict. At UN Security Council meetings, Pakistan called for an independent investigation into the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, asserting that India did not provide sufficient evidence regarding Pakistan’s involvement. India stated that it approached Pakistan over the past two years to reassess the IWT, but without success. India and Pakistan state that the reasoning behind Operation Sindoor also differs. India argues that the missile strikes were retaliation for the Pahalgam attack against terrorists, whereas Pakistan claims that its retaliation is against the missile strikes by India. The escalation received significant international attention, with calls for both sides to de-escalate. The United States said that it stands strong with India against terrorism, and after the missile strikes, it urged both sides to end the crisis and seek a peaceful resolution. Russia condemned acts of terrorism while calling for de-escalation. China called India’s missile strikes regrettable, while stating its opposition to all forms of terrorism and urging de-escalation. China also offered to collaborate with the international community and play a constructive role in addressing the conflict. Iran expressed readiness to help de-escalate tensions. Ultimately, a ceasefire was announced on May 10 between India and Pakistan to immediately stop the escalation and start a broad set of dialogues. Q4: What are the broader implications for strategic stability in South Asia? A4: Four initial implications emerge from the crisis. One is the emergence of a new era of technological conflict in the region. The crisis included the first-time use of drones in an aerial battle between India and Pakistan. Both sides accused each other of targeting military installations with these drone technologies. This will shape future conflicts, as both India and Pakistan are ramping up developments in conventional and nuclear capabilities. The crisis is witnessing higher levels of retaliation by both sides, indicating a lower risk tolerance toward conflict. Second, the escalation during the conflict reflects an evolving Indian posture in addressing terrorist attacks. India struck one JeM camp in 2019 during the Balakot crisis, when the Indian Armed Forces struck the camp in response to a terrorist attack in Pulwama, located in India-administered Kashmir. The 2025 strikes targeted nine camps within Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Indian defense experts highlight that this might indicate a shift in how India responds to terrorism, opting for high-intensity military responses to terrorist attacks. Prime Minister Modi stated that Operation Sindoor “carved out a new benchmark in our fight against terrorism,” setting up a new normal in India-Pakistan tensions. This includes (1) delivering a “fitting reply” to terrorist attacks on India; (2) rejecting nuclear blackmail and demonstrating a willingness to strike terrorist hideouts that come “under the cover of nuclear blackmail”; and (3) refusing to differentiate between state-sponsored terrorism and the masterminds behind the attacks. These benchmarks will have ramifications for any future border tensions between India and Pakistan, as terrorism continues to be a point of contention between the two countries. Terrorists and non-state actors could potentially drag the region into a nuclear crisis. Third, threatening nuclear escalation and engaging in nuclear rhetoric during the conflict have raised tensions. The abeyance of the IWT also comes during the peak of the summer, when water resources are limited and both sides of the border face drought-like conditions. Pakistan’s ambassador to Russia stated that Pakistan will use “both conventional and nuclear” weapons if India were to escalate or cut off water supplies. A Pakistani minister warned India that its 130 missiles were “kept for India,” and if India halts water supply, it should prepare for war. Nuclear rhetoric is not new to the conventional crisis, but this underscores the impact that critical infrastructure has on these conflicts in fueling further escalation. A New York Times article reported that when the Indian military struck Pakistan’s Nur Khan military base, Pakistan’s fear was the decapitation of the National Command Authority (NCA), the highest-ranking authority on nuclear and missile policy in Pakistan. Despite statements by officials on convening the NCA, Pakistan denied that the meeting took place. Most recently, the Indian defense minister called for oversight into Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which Pakistan strongly criticized. Disinformation tactics continue to remain prominent in the India-Pakistan conflict, even in the nuclear rhetoric. These include reports of a nuclear radiation leak in Pakistan with fabricated memos, as well as a supposed Indian attack on Kinara Hills in Pakistan, a nuclear storage facility, which India denied. Fourth, the deployment of capabilities by third-party actors has cascading effects—not just on strategic stability in South Asia, but also on broader geopolitical dynamics. An example of this is the Rafale episode. Pakistan claimed that it shot down Rafale jets, which India acquired from France, using Chinese-made J-10C jets and PL-15 missiles. Discrepancies remain regarding the number of Rafale jets shot down: while French intelligence claimed it was one, numerous Pakistani sources reported between three and six, and India has not responded to the claims. When asked about the involvement of the jets, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that China was not familiar with the matter. This not only has regional implications, but also signals to countries such as the United States and France the ability of Chinese-made capabilities to counter Western-produced defense systems. Q5: What is the status of the ceasefire, and how will it impact CBMs in the region? A5: On May 10, the United States announced that India and Pakistan agreed to an immediate ceasefire and to begin talks on a broad set of issues. A glaring difference between the responses from India and Pakistan, however, remains: Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif thanked President Trump for his role in bringing “lasting peace to South Asia” and strengthening the U.S.-Pakistan partnership going forward. On the other hand, India’s minister of foreign affairs stated that India and Pakistan worked out an understanding to stop the military action, but did not mention the role of third-party mediators such as the United States. Overall, while India and Pakistan accused one another of violations of the ceasefire agreement, tensions have simmered down since the start of the border conflict. Communication channels have remained open. The respective Indian and Pakistani directors general of military operations (DGMOs) communicated over the hotline regarding ceasefire violations along the LoC. The Indian media reported that the national security advisors of India and Pakistan, along with the high commissions, have kept diplomatic channels open, though this does not indicate dialogue on de-escalation. Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri revealed that India agreed to Pakistan’s bilateral request for a ceasefire after the Pakistani DGMO contacted India. Much remains unknown about ceasefire talks, including the extent to which the United States will mediate in these negotiations. These talks present India and Pakistan with the perfect opportunity to address concerns arising from developments during the crisis and subsequently develop off-ramps when crises occur. In his recent remarks in Saudi Arabia, President Trump stated that he offered trade as an off-ramp for escalation, claiming that the United States would no longer trade with India and Pakistan if they did not de-escalate. Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, also sent diplomats to de-escalate tensions between India and Pakistan. The role of third-party actors in mediating and calling for de-escalation in the India-Pakistan crisis continues to highlight their importance. Given the long and complex history between India and Pakistan, a structure for off-ramps should already be in place, rather than developed reactively during a conflict, when border tensions are at their peak. This structure could adopt existing proposals to have a standing communication body for Track 1 and 2 diplomacy to strengthen CBMs and discuss regional issues. Another proposal worth consideration recommends establishing a working group with the army chiefs and national security advisers of both India and Pakistan, ensuring a strong line of contact. These talks also present India and Pakistan with the opportunity to engage in dialogue over existing CBMs and crisis communication mechanisms. The dialogues could draw from the existing Track 1.5 and 2 dialogues taking place to identify ways to strengthen CBMs and establish off-ramps, including the discussions on the IWT, which India continues to hold in abeyance, and the Shimla Agreement. A recent publication from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on the Track 1.5 and 2 dialogues provides lessons learned from these dialogues. India and Pakistan should draw on these lessons—which include focusing dialogues on a broad set of topics, establishing platforms for India and Pakistan to express strategic concerns, and engaging in de-escalation off-ramps—as the current talks take place. Diya Ashtakala is a research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.