In 2020, the European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues convened senior nuclear policy experts from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States to discuss nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation issues and identify areas of consensus among the P3.
The expansion of dual-capable delivery systems and the diversification of strategic forms of warfare to include cyber, space, and advanced high precision conventional strike capabilities have sharply eroded structural conventional-nuclear firebreaks firebreaks.
Returning to the deal is not only viable but also presents the best chance of preventing an Iranian bomb.
This brief reflects discussions and insights from a deep dive workshop convened by PONI at Kings Bay Submarine Base on strategic stability and great power competition in the Arctic. This brief focuses on how climate, economic, and political trends in the Arctic region impact U.S. strategic interests, and the implications of these trends for nuclear stability, policy, and posture.
Why, exactly, does Iran’s abandoned nuclear weapons program still matter for U.S. policy? Three primary reasons stand out.
View the PONI panel and poster presentation from the 2020 STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium.
The areas of AI application into the nuclear enterprise are far left of an operational decision or decision to launch and include four priority sectors: (1) security and defense; (2) intelligence activities and indications and warning; (3) modeling and simulation, optimization, and data analytics; and (4) logistics and maintenance.
The brief examines the debate surrounding the development of U.S. nuclear warheads and whether the United States is creating “new” nuclear weapons.
In the nuclear realm, the challenge of civilian control is solved with presidential authority. Understanding and addressing the concessions that presidents might make to military expertise surfaces the precarious nature of civilian nuclear command and control.
The U.S. nuclear enterprise is going through a cycle of modernization that touches practically every system in the arsenal. This modernization push requires the nuclear enterprise to engage deeply with the defense acquisition system in a way it has not since its last major modernization cycle in the 1980s.