CSIS in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique organized the European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues in 2018.
With the continued use of nuclear power comes the question: How can nuclear toxic waste be disposed of effectively?
Extended nuclear deterrence strengthens alliances, except when it didn’t.
The European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), has convened senior nuclear policy experts from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States (P3) for the past nine years to discuss nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation policy issues and to identify areas of consensus among the three countries.
The NPT nuclear five lack shared norms of nuclear behavior. Pursuing a nuclear code of conduct could resolve that and help increase both dialogue and stability.
Given the potential for a conflict with a nuclear adversary, our ability to ensure that our general-purpose forces have the appropriate expertise and equipment to plan and operate in nuclear conditions would seem to be a critical requirement.
The prospect of the demise of U.S.-Russian bilateral arms control is a gloomy one. But the problem will not be improved by ignoring it.
An annual report produced by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on the current state of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation policies and initiatives.
A regularly updated fact sheet created by the Arms Control Association on the numbers of active nuclear weapons, broken down by country. The fact sheet also includes a report highlighting current nuclear security concerns and information on countries that had a nuclear weapons program but disbanded it.
A country-by-country breakdown produced by the Arms Control Association on the state of past and current arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that each state has or has not subscribed to. The profiles also describe the primary weapons programs, policies, and proliferation record of each country.