As increasingly capable and provocative situational awareness tools come into play, the very act of improving situational awareness may intensify escalation cycles in unanticipated ways, particularly among nuclear-armed states.
Iran announced Monday—and international inspectors confirmed—that it had exceeded the amount of enriched uranium it can have on hand under the terms of the nuclear deal (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA). The deal allows Iran to have up to 300kg of up to 3.67 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride.
If the United States is to consider a more aggressive counterproliferation strategy, it must occur beyond the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative.
President Trump leverages hegemonic masculinities to exercise power in pursuit of his political agenda. How does this affect U.S. nuclear policy and what does it mean for the future of arms control?
CSIS in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique organized the European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues in 2018.
The papers included in this volume comprise research from participants in the 2018 Nuclear Scholars Initiative and the PONI Conference Series. These papers explore such topics as the impacts of emerging technologies and capabilities, deep-diving on nuclear strategy and national policies, proposing paths forward for addressing proliferation challenges, and enhancing arms control in contentious environments.
With the continued use of nuclear power comes the question: How can nuclear toxic waste be disposed of effectively?
In the latest response to Russian INF Treaty violations, the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act renews calls for the development of a new missile system. This provision will not only violate the INF Treaty but also put the United States on a poor footing with its European allies. Read previous PONI intern and 2018 Capstone Read More
Is the 2018 NPR achieving one of its intended purposes—assuring allies in East Asia?
Once the U.S. bomber force is vulnerable to a first strike by a regional adversary, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to deter that state. The most probable solution to this impending strategic dilemma would be to develop a nuclear-tipped SLCM.