On January 5—amidst quickly escalating tensions between the United States and Iran—Tehran announced its latest steps to walk back its commitments to the 2015 nuclear deal.
Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons (Tarja Cronberg, SIPRI European Security Programme; Emad Kiyaei, American Iranian Council; Jamal Abdi, National Iranian American Council)
The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies invites you to join Representative Mike Turner of Ohio’s 10th congressional district, Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee, for a discussion on nuclear and missile proliferation in Iran and North Korea.
Iran’s nuclear actions so far do not merit a redline or the military response that could follow, nor do they rise to the level of an unacceptable threat to the United States or its interests. Rather, they are a signal that, although some in the Trump administration believe otherwise, Iran will not consent to being pushed via sanctions without seeking leverage of its own.
ERIC BREWER and RICHARD NEPHEW
A serious Iran strategy must identify the priority threats that must be stopped, even as other threats are addressed.
After sixteen months of negotiations, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached April 2, 2015 is an exceptional milestone in the thirty-six years of fraught relations between the West and the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, according to a statement delivered by President Obama outlining the JCPOA, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” and plenty of hazards exist along the way to reaching an eventual comprehensive agreement by the current talks’ stated deadline of June 30th.
There are currently five NWFZs, which have been bound by international treaties signed by all states in those respective regions. The idea of a Middle East NWFZ has been around for nearly forty years, when Iran first proposed it in 1974.