A Pact Shrouded in Speculation The signing of a Pakistan–Saudi Arabia mutual defense pact on 17 September 2025 has already stirred speculation about whether Islamabad has extended its nuclear deterrent beyond South Asia. The agreement, described by a Saudi official to Al Jazeera as a “comprehensive defensive arrangement encompassing all military means,” has fueled conjecture that Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella may now cover the Kingdom. Comments from anonymous Saudi Officials and Pakistan’s Defence Minister further fueled speculation. While the pact reassures Riyadh, it risks fueling nuclear misperceptions and could entail commitments that Islamabad cannot credibly sustain. Notwithstanding the political and economic appeal of implying extended deterrence to Saudi Arabia, the risks it creates – and the distraction it poses from Pakistan’s India-focused nuclear mission – far outweigh any strategic gains. Like the prior debates about a supposed “Islamic bomb” or Pakistan’s willingness to share nuclear weapons with Gulf allies, the reality is more complex. Pakistan’s nuclear posture has always been India-centric, designed for survival in a hostile neighborhood rather than for power projection in the Middle East. As a result, while Pakistan feels confident in the ability of its minimal nuclear forces to credibly deter its principal adversary, extending deterrence would make its policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) unviable. To change this, Pakistan would need to significantly invest in qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear forces like increased missile ranges, new delivery systems, and requisite Command Control Communications Computers Information Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4I2SR) capabilities etc. Still, extending deterrence would raise difficult questions around credibility, sustainability, and unintended escalation that Pakistan cannot afford. Pakistan and Gulf Security The tendency to read a nuclear dimension into Pakistan’s security commitments is hardly new. For decades, speculation about the role of Islamabad’s nuclear forces in Gulf security has surfaced whenever the Iranian nuclear program advances or Saudi anxieties dominate headlines. Today, these discussions also exist in response to ongoing Israeli aggression in the region. Much of this is rooted in four persistent narratives. First, the legacy of Dr. A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network (that supplied nuclear technology to Muslim states like Iran and Libya) lends credence to the idea that Pakistan could support the nuclear ambitions of other Muslim states. Second, observers have speculated whether Pakistan’s nuclear force represents an “Islamic bomb” intended for the collective defense of Muslim nations, given reports of Muslim states’ financial support for Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Third, Pakistan’s demonstration of the Shaheen-3 long-range missile capability that may be capable of targeting Israel has fueled speculation that its deterrent is aimed at states other than India. Fourth, Pakistan’s status as a nuclear-armed state outside the NPT provides grounds for questioning Pakistan’s commitment to non-proliferation. Against this backdrop, outside observers have long wondered if Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is intended to influence Middle Eastern Security. Yet these narratives overlook the single most important objective of Pakistan’s nuclear program: deterring India. Its arsenal, command-and-control systems, and doctrinal thinking are tailored to that Indian threat, not to providing security guarantees to partners thousands of kilometers away. For instance, Pakistan has based its second strike capability around a limited range cruise missile technology (Babur-3 with 450km range) and conventional submarines – providing a credible India-specific second strike capability. Despite Pakistan’s focus on India, ambiguity in the new pact may give political comfort to Saudi Arabia and create uncertainty for Israel or Iran. Perceived Merits of Ambiguity Even though the broader risks of ambiguity are significant, there remain certain political and strategic advantages for Pakistan in keeping it so. The lack of explicit nuclear language in the defense pact provides strategic flexibility. Islamabad can deepen ties with one of its most important economic and political partners while avoiding the formal obligations of extended deterrence. This vagueness enables Pakistan to project solidarity with Riyadh without disregarding international sensitivities or overcommitting itself. At a broader level, the pact enhances Pakistan’s regional leverage in the Middle East. By strengthening its alliance with Saudi Arabia, Islamabad increases its visibility in the Gulf and reminds other powers of its continued relevance to Middle Eastern security. Even speculation about nuclear guarantees can be politically useful, since it underscores Pakistan’s importance without requiring actual commitments. Finally, ambiguity may provide a psychological deterrent. Rivals such as Israel or Iran cannot easily dismiss the possibility, however remote, that Saudi Arabia might enjoy a nuclear umbrella. In deterrence theory, uncertainty itself can serve as a stabilizing factor by making potential aggressors think twice before acting. Risks of Ambiguity Ambiguity may offer short-term diplomatic convenience, but it carries long-term risks that Pakistan cannot ignore. First, it creates a credibility dilemma: while Saudi Arabia’s adversaries may assume a nuclear dimension to the pact, Pakistan itself has neither the arsenal size nor the doctrinal space to extend deterrence credibly beyond South Asia. Pakistan’s limited number of warheads may be sufficient to deter India but would require substantial qualitative and quantitative improvements to do so for additional adversaries. On the doctrinal side, Pakistan would need to define much more specifically as to when it could consider using nuclear weapons to make extended deterrence credible. Pakistan’s current policy of strategic ambiguity may suffice for deterring India, but such ambiguity could generate crisis instability when extending deterrence. Empty signals without the requisite capability will erode — rather than strengthen— deterrence. Second, Pakistan’s ambiguous security guarantee invites international suspicion. Even without explicit nuclear commitments, outsiders are likely to interpret the phrase “all military means” as a reference to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. This could complicate Pakistan’s relations with Western powers (and Iran), and undercut its efforts to project responsibility in global nuclear forums. Third, Pakistan’s ambiguous position could create regional fallout. While Iran has welcomed the agreement, it may feel compelled to accelerate its nuclear program or view Pakistan as a threat. Israel may also come to view Pakistan as a greater threat, and could adjust its own nuclear forces accordingly. Other states, such as the UAE or Qatar, could also reconsider their defense postures, fearing exclusion from a Saudi–Pakistani arrangement. These risks highlight why the appeal of ambiguity is essentially superficial and why its long-term strategic costs – for credibility, regional stability, and Pakistan’s own diplomatic standing – are significantly higher than acknowledged. Conclusion The nuclear dimension of Pakistan–Saudi Arabia mutual defense pact is perhaps more speculative than substantive. By invoking the language of “all military means,” the agreement hints at the possibility of a nuclear guarantee without making it explicit, leaving space for both reassurance and misperception. For Riyadh, this ambiguity provides security; for Islamabad, it elevates political standing without requiring overt doctrinal change. Yet the dangers outweigh the benefits. Ambiguity risks entangling Pakistan in Gulf rivalries, inviting international suspicion, and reinforcing the very myths — of an “Islamic bomb” or a transferable nuclear umbrella — that Islamabad has struggled to dispel for decades. More fundamentally, it distracts from Pakistan’s overriding strategic reality: its nuclear capability exists to deter India, not to underwrite regional security architectures beyond South Asia. In the end, ambiguity may offer short-term diplomatic leverage, but it blurs red lines and increases the chance of dangerous miscalculation. If Pakistan wishes to be seen as a responsible stakeholder, it must ensure that its role in Gulf security is understood as political — not nuclear.1 The author used AI in the editing process to improve this article’s structure and clarity. ↩︎