At various points since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, debates have bubbled up about whether Russian President Vladimir Putin might deliberately use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Putin has consistently rattled the nuclear saber, issued nuclear threats, and even conducted an exercise involving tactical nuclear weapons. However, the Kremlin has so far refrained from following through on these threats, despite continued Western support for Ukraine. This has led some politicians and observers to suggest that Putin’s threats are probably a bluff. They argue that using nuclear weapons would be unwise for a variety of strategic, political and military reasons that are indeed very hard to deny. The key question is whether Putin is likely to come to a similar conclusion. Much of the commentary that suggests that Putin is bluffing is steeped in what Jonathan Renshon calls “mirroring risk” or the tendency to project one’s own framing of a decision onto an adversary and to assume that an adversary shares one’s risk tolerance. Rather than focusing solely on the potential downsides of nuclear use for Putin, it is important to consider the potential benefits from his perspective. Once one revisits the underlying assumptions many Western observers (implicitly) hold about Putin’s thinking, a more disturbing range of plausible Russian courses of action emerges. While this does not mean Putin’s threats should be taken at face value, it underlines the need to continually reassess one’s own analytical priors and recognize where they may need correction. Reasons to think that the Kremlin is bluffing Those who argue that fears of Russia intentionally escalating to the nuclear level are exaggerated have cited several compelling reasons. First, there is the argument that any actual use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine would contradict Russian nuclear doctrine and President Putin’s own stated policies. Official documents lay out four conditions under which the Kremlin would consider using nuclear weapons: esponse to an incoming missile, nuclear use by an adversary, a conventional attack on Russia’s strategic assets, or threats to the existence of the Russian state. Various respected military analysts contend that none of these conditions currently apply in Ukraine. They argue that even a defeat of Russia in Ukraine cannot be reasonably considered an existential threat of the survival of the state. Thus,for as long as no one is marching to Moscow, the Kremlin is unlikely to resort to the absolute weapon. Second, and relatedly, the respected military historian Lawrence Freedman has raised important questions about what, if any, military advantage a nuclear strike in Ukraine would bring for the Kremlin. Freedman explains how even a surprise detonation for demonstrative purposes could present a challenge as the advanced intelligence apparatus of the West would likely detect the preparations for such an event. Furthermore, it is unclear whether a delivery system may be intercepted and whether Russia’s weapons are as reliable as the Kremlin would like them to be. A larger scale attack could overcome such challenges but raises new problems related to nuclear fallout, which would not only impact Ukraine but potentially also Russia and its troops. Targeting the Ukrainian leadership, for its part, would leave Russia with the problem of whom to organize a potential surrender with. Taken together, these operational complexities underscore that Putin may very well think twice before escalating to the nuclear level. Third, and finally, observers have argued that any nuclear weapons use, for the first time in seven decades, could trigger a range of adverse global reactions. The Biden administration, for instance, has hinted that the gloves may come off in such a scenario. The West may respond with devastating (non-)nuclear capabilities and cripple Russian forces and its war-supporting industry. China might stop its implicit backing of Russia, and together with the rest of the world truly isolate Moscow this time. Domestically, Russian society may disapprove of the Kremlin’s actions and backlash may emerge. In short, the world could look a lot grimmer for Russia in the after pulling the nuclear trigger. Assessing Putin’s reasoning and risk propensity The arguments presented above are hard to contest if, and only if, one accepts several important assumptions about Putin’s framing of his predicament in Ukraine. The claim that a military defeat in Ukraine does not pose an existential threat to the Russian state is probably true from a military point of view. States often lose wars and such defeats do not necessarily lead to state collapse or regime change. However, can one really assume that Putin views Ukraine solely as a military problem to be solved? There are various ways in which to link the conflict in Ukraine to Putin’s own fate. There is his reputation as a tough leader, the Russian elite’s conception of Russia as a great power, or their politico-economic fate. In other words, the notion of “the existence of the Russian state” is partially a social construction. This makes it challenging to determine when a threat becomes existential for Putin. In this very vein, CIA Director William Burns has noted that Putin himself believes he “cannot afford to lose.” A second assumption that permeates much of the debate on whether Putin might push the proverbial button is the notion that the value of Ukraine is not large enough to justify the risks of nuclear use. Observers generally agree that any nuclear use would come with a high cost, both for the aggressor and the victim. While there are indeed compelling reasons for Putin not to resort to nuclear weapons use, a arises: If faced with defeat, what would be the cost to Putin of not using a nuclear weapon? One cost is that refraining from nuclear use might make military defeat more likely. Additionally, there are potential benefits to consider. One potential benefit of using nuclear weapons could indeed be that it leads to victory for the Kremlin. As Frank Gavin writes, “one can conjure up a scenario where the world reacts in horror to Russian nuclear use and, fearing further nuclear escalations, demands the conflict end, forcing Ukraine to the negotiating table – all to Russia’s advantage.” Essentially, while Ukraine and its supporters clearly have an interest in signaling a high cost for Russia, there is much uncertainty about these costs, let alone any potential benefits for the aggressor. It is moreover an open question whether Putin sees the costs – as threatened to him by the West – as likely. None of this is to suggest that focusing on the cost of nuclear weapons is wrong. Instead, discussions of costs must be assessed in reference to the cost of non-use or, alternatively, the benefits of use. A final and related point relates to assumptions about Putin’s risk propensity or tolerance. Admittedly, if Putin views the use of nuclear weapons as not risky at all, or if he is unaware of the risks involved, any discussions about risk acceptance becomes moot. However, such a scenario is highly unlikely to be the case in practice when it comes to nuclear weapons. Putin could of course also choose to ignore any risks. But perhaps more importantly, there is the possibility that Putin might simply be highly risk acceptant. In fact, some analysts have argued that with the invasion of February 2022, the Kremlin was seemingly willing to accept “potentially astronomical costs and risks for itself.” Putin’s risk propensity may also have evolved since 2022. To put it bluntly, deterrence fails if an adversary is willing to take the risk, even when faced with potentially severe punishment. Conclusion There are numerous reasons why it would seem unwise for Putin to deliberately use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. One can hope that he will come to this conclusion, or that his advisors will convince him of this very case. Still, it is important not to project one’s own framing of a situation onto the Kremlin and assume that it shares the same risk tolerance. Any potential costs of nuclear use must be weighed against the costs of non-use and the perceived benefits of use and take into consideration Putin’s risk propensity. There is simply a lot we do not know about Putin’s thought process and history is fraught with miscommunication and misunderstanding. This is by no means to suggest that Ukraine and its partners should concede to Putin. Supporting Ukraine is a just cause. However, the best path forward remains one that acknowledges the serious risks involved, strives to reduce nuclear tensions and reinforces the nuclear taboo.