Analysis / Next Gen CommunityIs the Hunt Back On? Attacks on Strategic Forces Illustrate China’s Nuclear Survivability ConcernsByJupiter HuangPublished Aug 15, 2025Operation Rising Lion combined intelligence, asymmetric operations, and conventional forces to significantly degrade Iran’s ability to launch ballistic missiles in retaliation for Israeli actions. When coupled with Ukraine’s attacks against Russian strategic bombers, mobile nuclear forces must now be resilient to a rapidly changing threat environment. This is most prevalent in the case of China. By focusing on building siloed ICBMs, China’s near-term nuclear forces remain much more vulnerable to disarming strikes than the numerical U.S.-China nuclear balance suggests. Beijing’s nuclear modernization has qualitative shortfalls that the U.S. must incorporate into force planning and arms control considerations.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityDisruption or Dismantlement: Diverging Assessments of Iran Nuclear StrikesByBailey SchiffPublished Jul 1, 2025Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer were widely hailed as a marvel of operational success, but the true measure of strategic success hinges on a murkier question: did the strikes merely delay Iran’s nuclear program or dismantle it for good?
Analysis / CommentaryThe Fallout Factor in Targeting Iran’s Nuclear ProgramByDoreen Horschig and Bailey SchiffPublished Jun 25, 2025Operation Midnight Hammer may mark the ceiling that conventional force can achieve against Iran’s nuclear program without triggering fallout. For Israel, this means future operations will likely involve sites that are more fortified or environmentally risky, or both.
Analysis / CommentaryWhat Operation Midnight Hammer Means for the Future of Iran’s Nuclear AmbitionsByJoseph RodgersPublished Jun 25, 2025Operation Midnight Hammer struck Iran’s key nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan using B-2s and Tomahawk cruise missiles. This effort aimed to destroy Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities, but its success is still to be determined.
Analysis / CommentaryIran and the Changing Character of the Nonproliferation RegimeByJoseph RodgersPublished Jun 20, 2025Rising tensions with Iran expose a volatile shift in the nonproliferation regime. As the regime’s normative power wanes, proliferation risks will rise, and military counterproliferation efforts will be more likely.
Analysis / CommentaryOptions for Targeting Iran’s Fordow Nuclear FacilityByHeather WilliamsPublished Jun 20, 2025There are five main options for targeting Iran’s Fordow facility: the GBU-57, sustained Israeli strikes, sabotage, nuclear weapons, and diplomacy. Each varies in its potential impact on Iran’s nuclear program and carries distinct risks of escalation and response.
Analysis / CommentaryThree Things Will Determine Iran’s Nuclear Future—Fordow Is Just One of ThemByHeather WilliamsPublished Jun 18, 2025Further strikes on Fordow, potentially with U.S. support, could be imminent, but their success is just one factor that will shape Iran’s nuclear future—along with possible withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and support from Russia and China.
Analysis / CommentaryWhat Do the Israeli Strikes Mean for Iran’s Nuclear Program?ByHeather Williams, Doreen Horschig and Bailey SchiffPublished Jun 18, 2025Israel launched an unprecedented attack on Iran’s nuclear and military sites. The future of Iran’s program and regional proliferation risks will depend on the success of Israel’s campaign, the international response, and Tehran’s perceived need for nuclear weapons.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityDespite Progress in Talks, the Threat of a Nuclear Iran LoomsBySyed Ali Zia JafferyPublished Apr 24, 2025While the ongoing Oman process between the U.S. and Iran is a positive development, the threat of Iran’s nuclearization still looms. There are three reasons why this is the case. First, the trust deficit between the two parties is hard to mitigate. Iran remembers Trump’s first term and his approach toward the Iran nuclear deal in particular and Iran in general. Second, Trump’s threats of military coercion will make Iran more vulnerable, with hardliners, including Ali Khamenei, likely to see nuclear weapons as their best deterrent. Third, the disintegration of its Axis of Resistance has left it with no other option but to get a deterrent of its own. All of this means that jingoism must give way to prudence and deft diplomacy.
Analysis / Next Gen CommunityHezbollah’s Fall: Implications for Iran’s Nuclear AspirationsByBailey SchiffPublished Nov 8, 2024In ten days, Israel decapitated Hezbollah as an organization, leaving behind only fighters previously deemed not important enough to have a beeper. Beyond a tactical operation, by electing to conduct all three operations in daylight, civilians in Lebanon and Iran were forced to confront Hezbollah’s weakness. Although these operations were transformative, this crippling of Hezbollah will likely send nuclear shockwaves through the region by incentivizing both Tehran’s nuclear weaponization and Israeli targeting of Iranian nuclear facilities. As the region braces for continued conflict between Israel and Iran after the U.S. election, rather than striking nuclear facilities, Israel should target economic centers of gravity, bolster influence operations, and leverage domestic unrest in Iran and Lebanon to destabilize the regime. At the same time, the U.S. should raise the political and economic costs of maintaining a nuclear program. This approach can foster democracy, enhance Mossad intelligence operations, and compel Iran to reallocate military financing, laying the groundwork for lasting peace.