Photo: Alex Brandon-Pool/Getty Images Introduction In a 20-minute speech on April 1, President Donald Trump referred to nuclear weapons over 20 times. The speech opened with an overview of the risks of a nuclear Iran as justification for the war and outlined progress in setting back the program: “For years, everyone has said that Iran cannot have nuclear weapons. But in the end, those are just words. If you’re not willing to take action when the time comes.” By relying on the nuclear justification for the war, however, Trump may have painted himself into a corner because now, the end of the war must also have a nuclear solution. The nuclear issue is likely to determine not only when the war ends, but also how it ends, and who can claim “victory.” Ultimately, Trump needs a face-saving and expeditious off-ramp to resolve the nuclear issue if he is to achieve his objectives as outlined in the speech. Status of the Nuclear Stockpile Trump’s speech included a nuclear justification for the war and a broad overview of the damage done to Iran’s nuclear program, but the details will matter when it comes time to negotiate a peace agreement. Operation Rising Lion and Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025 significantly set back Iran’s nuclear program, particularly with the strikes on Fordow and Isfahan. Claims by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stating “Iran’s nuclear ambitions have been obliterated,” however, appear to have been a bit of an overstatement. The strikes are believed to have rendered centrifuges, equipment, and facilities unusable, but important details about the nuclear program remain unknown. Most importantly, where is Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium? Some reporting indicated the stockpile was buried in Isfahan following the Midnight Hammer strikes. But International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi indicated on March 9 that the stockpile was now in two locations: the underground tunnel complex of Isfahan, along with Natanz. Another question is the status of Iran’s nuclear equipment and expertise. In the aftermath of Operation Rising Lion last June, Israeli Ambassador Joshua Zarka claimed that Israel had assassinated 14 of Iran’s leading scientists. Israel also targeted centrifuge production facilities across Iran. The current status of Iran’s technical and scientific capacity has drastically diminished, but Iran still maintains some capacity. Iran operates several research and nuclear power reactors, including a Russian-operated power reactor at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Additionally, there may be centrifuges stored in underground facilities, enabling a clandestine nuclear program. But the real challenge is not a technical one, such as the status of the stockpile or enrichment capacity. Rather, it is the deep distrust on both sides that they will uphold their end of any future nuclear bargain, including as part of a peace agreement. The United States and Israel are unlikely to trust any enrichment on Iranian soil, for fear that they could again break out and enrich beyond the 3–5 percent necessary for most peaceful uses. But Iran is also likely deeply distrustful of Washington after Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, and may again worry not only that the United States will break out of any diplomatic agreement, but also that diplomacy is a cover for military preparation. Ensuring that Iran can never produce a nuclear weapon has remained a consistent point of justification for both the United States and Israel. For example, on March 30, Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the primary U.S. demand as “The Iranian regime can never have nuclear weapons . . . their desire to have this nuclear weapon to threaten and blackmail the world with, that will never be allowed to happen. It’s too great a risk.” And as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on February 28, in his opening statement as the war was launched “The risk of not acting is immeasurably greater, because if we do not act, we will face a nuclear Iran, an Iran with tens of thousands of ballistic missiles, an Iran that will work to destroy us and be immune to our counteractions.” Any nuclear off-ramp will need to address long-standing U.S. and Israeli demands, along with some Iranian hard-liners who have not changed in decades. The U.S. and Israeli position is that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon, must verifiably dismantle nuclear infrastructure, including the stockpile, and can never enrich uranium on Iranian soil. In sharp contrast, Iran’s position is that domestic enrichment is an inalienable right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and nuclear-related sanctions must be lifted. Three Options for Nuclear Off-Ramps Trump’s speech is largely being interpreted as setting the stage for continued fighting, but Trump gave at least two indications of how it might end. First was the assertion that “regime change has occurred because of all of their original leaders’ death,” meaning the administration seems willing to negotiate with the current leadership without more dramatic changes. And second, Trump’s numerous and explicit references to damage to the nuclear program suggest he may be hoping that the nuclear issue has been resolved and won’t play a spoiler role. The nuclear issue has not gone away and will need to be part of the denouement of the war. There is the remaining highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, along with Iran’s indigenous nuclear knowledge, including in centrifuge technology. Additionally, as a result of the war, Iran may emerge more determined than ever to acquire a nuclear weapon to deter future conflict. The Ayatollah presumably prefers the fate of Kim Jong Un to that of Muammar Gaddafi. Israel is also likely to insist on a clearer resolution to the nuclear issue. Therefore, Trump needs a nuclear solution. We can identify at least three nuclear off-ramps that could contribute to resolving the nuclear issue as part of ending the war. The Military Option Numerous reports indicate that President Trump is considering deploying U.S. troops to seize or destroy Iran’s stockpile of 440.9 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium. This material is deeply buried in at least one, and possibly several, locations across Iran. The IAEA director general, Rafael Grossi, recently stated that at least half of the nuclear material is being stored at the underground facility near the Isfahan nuclear complex. If President Trump decides to resort to a military solution, there are at least three possible options. First, the United States could choose to conduct a sustained aerial campaign aimed at destroying these underground facilities. This option would be the least politically costly, since it would not incur the need for boots on the ground. However, it is also less likely to succeed over the long-term. Previous strikes during Operation Midnight Hammer against Natanz and Fordow already tested the upper limits of U.S. “bunker-busting” technology with the GBU-57 Massive Ordinance Penetrator. Iran’s nuclear material is likely buried deep in the underground facilities, and direct hits with bunker busters may only entomb the material rather than destroy it. If this option is chosen, the United States and Israel would likely continually monitor these sites and be prepared to attack if Iran launches recovery efforts. The second and third options both involve putting boots on the ground. One path is to send a ground raid to known facilities, including Isfahan’s underground facility, to blow up the facilities from the inside. This would require a large expeditionary force to secure a perimeter around the facilities, demolition teams to break through the buried tunnel entrances, and teams to destroy the facility. Any personnel entering the tunnels would need self-contained breathing apparatus suits. By exploding the facilities, the United States could render the material incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to recover. However, without verification, there would be no guarantee that all the fissile material was destroyed. The most comprehensive option is to seize and remove the material from Iranian control. This operation would bust open the tunnel entrances, identify and remove the nuclear material, and transport it away from Iran. The material could be verified and then safely down-blended with other low-enriched uranium stocks. This option, while the most diplomatically definitive, involves incredible risks. Slow flying cargo transportation airplanes and vehicle convoys would be needed to bring material in and out of Iran. An operation like this would take hundreds or thousands of troops and very detailed infiltration and exfiltration logistics. This type of operation has been described by military experts as the “most complicated special operation in history.” The Diplomatic Option Second is the diplomatic option. On March 25, the Trump administration offered a 15-point peace plan using Pakistan as a mediator, which included limits on Iran’s nuclear program, such as dismantling all nuclear facilities, turning over all nuclear material and equipment to the IAEA, and never again enriching uranium. An Iranian source responded that, “Iran is ready to provide all the necessary guarantees that it will never develop nuclear weapons but is entitled to peaceful use of nuclear technology.” The diplomatic option would need to find a workaround for this impasse. One potential solution is to make Iran’s right to enrich conditional on verification that it does not have any weapons ambitions, and allowing time to dismantle its nuclear facilities. In many ways, this was always the bargain: While the NPT allows for access to nuclear material for peaceful uses, that only applies as long as states are in good standing with their NPT obligations and not seeking nuclear material for military purposes. For example, Princeton Policy Advisors recommend, “Iran’s nuclear development sites of Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow to remain off-limits for the next three years.” The JCPOA limited enrichment for 10 years, which was still considered insufficient for many critics of the deal, including Israel. Therefore, the agreement would need to be paired with more stringent verification measures and the complete dismantlement and verification of existing nuclear facilities. Another diplomatic option is a regional nuclear consortium, whereby Iran, along with other regional partners, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, would jointly develop low-enriched uranium under international verification. Iran hypothetically could have an enrichment site in another country, allowing for stricter verification and lower risk of diversion. Frank von Hippel and others have outlined the details of such an option, which apparently has gained some traction with Iranian leadership. The Fig Leaf Option Finally, the third option is a return to status quo ante with lots of hand-waving. It’s difficult to imagine the United States fighting the current conflict with Iran ostensibly over its nuclear program, only for that conflict to end with Iran maintaining a stockpile of 440.9 kilograms of HEU. President Trump’s speech, however, seemed intended to signal that the nuclear issue was settled and he would prefer to focus on fighting and winning, particularly to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. In a recent phone interview with CBS, President Trump reportedly failed to specify whether he could declare victory in the Iran conflict while leaving the stockpile of HEU in the country. Instead, he emphasized the difficulty of a military operation to take the material. Trump stated that the uranium is “so deeply buried it’s gonna be hard for anybody . . . it’s down there deep. . . . but, you know, we’ll make a determination.” Trump’s quote could be seen as an attempt to wave away the problem of Iran’s uranium stockpile by framing it as inaccessible. If this conflict ends without a diplomatic solution to the nuclear problem, then it is highly likely to galvanize Iran to pursue a clandestine nuclear program. Iranian hardliners and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are already indicating a push for developing a nuclear weapon to prevent a future event like Operation Midnight Hammer or Operation Epic Fury. Even if the United States walks away from the problem and leaves Iran with a lingering stockpile, it will likely take years for Tehran to rebuild a fully robust nuclear program. If such a program is discovered, Israel or the United States would likely repeat military operations in the future, leading to a volatile cycle of counterproliferation efforts. Bury, Bind, and Bargain The most likely off-ramp is some combination of the military, diplomatic, and fig leaf options. The priorities should be preventing Iran from rebuilding its nuclear program in the short- to medium-term to allow time for inspections and negotiating a long-term solution. The first step may require military options such as additional strikes on nuclear facilities to further bury the remaining stockpile, requiring extensive digging to access. The United States would be able to observe if Iran tried to retrieve the material. Trump indicated as much in his speech: “The nuclear sites that we obliterated with the B-2 bombers have been hit so hard that it would take months to get near the nuclear dust. And we have it under intense satellite surveillance and control. If we see them make a move, even a move for it, we’ll hit them with missiles very hard again.” The United States may need to conduct additional strikes to further bury the known stockpile, particularly at Isfahan. If the war escalates and leads to boots on the ground, the administration may also consider a coordinated operation to remove the stockpile, but this would require complex planning and a longer-term operation because of the size of the stockpile and the nature of its storage. The administration could choose to seize the most accessible material, possibly at Isfahan, and then seek to entomb the material at other locations. The IAEA should then play an essential role in dismantling and removing what remains of Iran’s nuclear program. This will be a hard line for the United States in any negotiation to end the war. As part of its operations, the IAEA may need to oversee a new effort to identify options for retrieving the buried stockpile, which may require robotics and heavy-digging equipment beyond the scope of the IAEA’s capacity. This may not be a quick or easy resolution, but it would require multinational expertise and investment. Finally, the United States will need to bargain with Iran to resolve the enrichment issue. The military option could potentially remove Iran’s nuclear material in the short-term. But it doesn’t solve the problem of ending the war since Iran is likely to continue to insist on enrichment, and Israel likely won’t accept any level of enrichment. The regional enrichment consortium is one creative solution that seemingly had support from both Iran and the United States and can serve as a starting point. Ultimately, the nuclear issue remains one of the largest impediments to a clear end to the Iran conflict. President Trump’s speech yesterday painted Iran’s nuclear program as the primary justification for this war. For now, it seems that the best option is to bury the material and negotiate a long-term solution that caps Iran’s nuclear program. If the United States fails to achieve a definitive solution, we risk a cycle of perpetual conflict. A face-saving nuclear off-ramp is possible, but only if the administration accepts that it needs comprehensive negotiations to address the long-term risks of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Heather Williams is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Joseph Rodgers is deputy director and fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.