What does the American public think about US nuclear weapons policy?

Faced with evolving nuclear threats, such as the potential for Iranian proliferation and the two-peer problem, deteriorating arms control, and an aging nuclear weapons infrastructure and arsenal that may be insufficient for current deterrence needs, the United States is experiencing a need to modernize its arsenal and assess what arms control will look like in this environment. This also requires an understanding of what the US public thinks about these topics, even if they may have less influence on nuclear policy than other policy areas, such as education or health care.

Yet, public opinion still matters for nuclear decisions. During the Cold War, when the public was more aware of nuclear issues, it was engaged and had an influence on nuclear decisions, such as the nuclear freeze and protests against anti-ballistic missile sites. While nuclear issues have been less salient in the post-Cold War era, nuclear risks are increasing, and so is public awareness of them. Recent research has demonstrated that the public may be more supportive of nuclear weapons when the public has heightened perceptions of risk. Additionally, studies have explored the extent to which the public has influence on nuclear decisionmaking, primarily around use, rather than other decisions. However, before we can understand what influence the public may have on decisions such as spending and arms control, it’s important to understand their thoughts on particular policy decisions and the potential implications of those opinions.

In the first post, I discuss trends in American public opinion on nuclear programs spending and arms control treaties. In the second post, I explore the potential implications of the public’s opinion, why public engagement and awareness matter, and potential recommendations for public engagement on nuclear issues. I use data from the University of Oklahoma Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis Annual National Security Survey (IPPRA NS Survey). The survey has been fielded since 1993, and annually since 2005, with the exceptions of 2012-2014. The sample of US adults closely matches US Census estimates,¹ and is repeated, cross-sectional, with approximately 2,000 respondents annually. The survey asks respondents about national security topics, ranging from foreign policy priorities to perceptions of nuclear war risk, to more nuanced policy questions, such as spending on nuclear programs and support for US participation in arms control treaties.

Spending

In the post-Cold War era, nuclear issues have been less salient to the public, as other international and domestic policy challenges have received more media attention. However, the evolving threat environment and modernization budget challenges have brought increased public attention. The public, while not typically involved in nuclear decision-making and having expressed unfamiliarity with nuclear weapons, still has the ability to form opinions about nuclear policy. Furthermore, public opinion on the costs of nuclear programs may be particularly important at a time when the US public has expressed concern about the economy and many are facing economic uncertainty, due to a range of challenges, including inflation. Additionally, the issue of government efficiency is a major priority of the Trump Administration. Modernization efforts will be costly. In total, modernization is estimated to cost $1.7 trillion, and some projects, such as the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, have already far exceeded their budgets. The Sentinel program breached the Nunn-McCurdy Act, a law that holds defense projects accountable to their budgets and requires a review of the program if budgets exceed 15% of the baseline budget. This leads to the question: amid this evolving nuclear threat environment and widespread economic concerns, how does public support vary regarding nuclear weapons funding?

Table 1 displays the four questions respondents saw regarding nuclear weapons spending. These questions were included on the survey in 2011, 2015-201, and in 2022. Respondents were asked how government spending should change regarding existing and new nuclear weapons on a scale of 1 (Substantially decrease) to 7 (Substantially increase), with the mid-point 4, indicating spending should stay the same.

Table 1: Survey Questions on Nuclear Weapons Spending

Question	Scale	Survey Years
How should government spending change for ensuring the reliability and safety of existing U.S. nuclear weapons?	1- Substantially Decrease to 7 – Substantially Increase	2011; 2015-2017; 2022
How should government spending change for improving the precision or effectiveness of existing nuclear weapons?	1- Substantially Decrease to 7 – Substantially Increase	2016-2017; 2022
How should government spending change for developing new nuclear weapons?	1- Substantially Decrease to 7 – Substantially Increase	2016-2017; 2022
How should government spending change for testing new nuclear weapons?	1- Substantially Decrease to 7 – Substantially Increase	2016-2017; 2022

Figure 1 displays the mean response for each spending category by year. For the categories “developing new nuclear weapons” and “testing new nuclear weapons,” the mean response was just below 4 for all years, indicating that the public believes spending should stay about the same. For the other two categories, “improving existing nuclear weapons” and “ensuring reliability and safety of existing nuclear weapons,” the mean response for all years was above 4 to slightly below 5, indicating that the public believes spending should increase slightly. These results remain relatively steady from year to year. However, the support for spending increases on improving existing nuclear weapons versus the preference for spending staying the same or decreasing slightly on new nuclear weapons is interesting in the current modernization context. This may be indicative of a lack of public knowledge regarding the aging arsenal or the opinion that spending is sufficient. While members of the public may or may not be aware of the US’s modernization needs, the public may be unsupportive of substantial spending increases on new nuclear warheads or delivery systems.²

Figure 1: Mean Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons Program Spending

Arms Control

Whereas the public has typically had less input in nuclear programs’ spending, the public has had more influence on arms control and disarmament. Research has demonstrated that public pressure influenced every stage of arms control during the Cold War, from agenda setting to implementation. The current arms control environment is deteriorating. The last remaining Russia-US treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, is set to expire in 2026, and nonproliferation and disarmament treaties are facing challenges, particularly with concerns of proliferation from Europe to Iran. However, there have been some indications that the Trump Administration may want to pursue arms control talks with Russia, China, and Iran.

The IPPRA NS Survey asks respondents about their support for three treaties: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT, the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty, and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The US has signed but not ratified the CTBT, is a party to the NPT, and the terms of the FMCT are still being negotiated as part of broader discussions in the Conference on Disarmament.

Table 2 details the survey questions respondents saw regarding treaty support. Respondents did not see the treaty name, but a brief description, and were asked how they felt about U.S. participation in each of the three treaties. Respondents were asked to rate support from 1 (Strongly Oppose) to 7 (Strongly Support).

Table 2

Question	Scale	Survey Years
Using a scale from one to seven where one means strongly oppose and seven means strongly support, how do you feel about the U.S. participating in a treaty that bans all nuclear test explosions?	1- Strongly Oppose to 7-Strongly Support	2006-2011; 2015-2023
On the same scale from one to seven where one means strongly oppose and seven means strongly support, how do you feel about the U.S. participating in a treaty that bans the production of nuclear materials that could be used to make nuclear weapons?	1- Strongly Oppose to 7-Strongly Support	1- Strongly Oppose to 7-Strongly Support
Again, using the same scale from one to seven, where one means strongly oppose and seven means strongly support, how do you feel about the U.S. agreeing to a provision that requires the U.S. to eventually eliminate all of its nuclear weapons?	1- Strongly Oppose to 7-Strongly Support	2010-2011; 2015-2023

Figure 2: Mean Public Opinion on Arms Control Treaties

Figure 2 displays average support for the three different arms control treaties. Average support is highest for the CTBT, with the mean falling between 5 and 6, indicating moderate to strong support. Support for the FMCT is closely behind the CTBT, with average support slightly above 5, indicating moderate to strong support. On average, the NPT has the least support, yet still moderate and above midline on the scale, with mean support falling between 5 and 6. While implications will be discussed in additional detail in Part 2, this moderate to high support may indicate public support for new arms control talks under the Trump Administration. However, as will be discussed in Part 3, there are differences between long-standing treaties and new agreements with adversaries.

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1. Data is weighted to account for any discrepancies between the sample and U.S. Census estimates.
2. Preferences related to spending and treaties differ based upon respondent characteristics. For more, see: Peach, Kaitlin. 2025. Nuclear (In)Security in a Post-Cold War.