On December 19, 2024, U.S. Principal Deputy National Security Advisor Jonathan Finer announced that Pakistan is developing long-range ballistic missile capabilities “to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States.” The United States imposed sanctions on four entities in Pakistan involved in the development of the country’s ballistic missiles. Pakistan strongly opposed the sanctions calling them “unfortunate and unbiased,” and that its strategic capabilities are meant to “preserve peace and stability in South Asia.” After the sanctions, a series of actions taken in the past couple of weeks include further diplomatic criticism, India and Pakistan exchanging a list of their nuclear assets, the United States ending restrictions on India’s nuclear energy entities, and sanctions imposed by China on the United States. As the United States imposes sanctions on Pakistan, it is strengthening cooperation and unrolling restrictions on India. Sanctions on Pakistani entities and concerns over the missile highlight a potential threat to the United States. The situation becomes particularly challenging given it is from South Asia, where the regional dynamics traditionally drive capabilities. Pakistan’s missile development and ability to target the United States indicates an emerging nuclear threat. While U.S.-India and Pakistan-China defense partnerships have developed over time, both relationships are accelerating at a faster pace in response to evolving security challenges. Much remains unknown about this development. While the United States has monitored this for a few years, there are many questions as more details become public. The Trump administration needs to carefully navigate its precarious equation with Pakistan and track potential threats from the region’s nuclear landscape. U.S. diplomatic efforts with Pakistan are at an impasse despite the proposed confidence-building measures, or CBMs, by the Biden administration. Washington should take a step back and examine cases of previous confidence-building measures in South Asia, extracting success and failures, and approach India on the best ways to engage with Pakistan. This would provide the United States with a revitalized strategy with Pakistan while strengthening ties with India. Sanctions Imposed by the United States on Pakistan In December 2024, the U.S. Department of State announced sanctions against four Pakistan entities involved in the ballistic missile program including the National Development Complex (NDC), responsible for the development of Pakistan’s ballistic missiles. The sanctions imposed under the executive order “[target] proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.” Calling Pakistan an emerging threat, Finer stated that these concerns emerge from significantly large-diameter solid rocket motors, giving it the ability to target the United States. Pakistan strongly criticized the U.S. sanctions imposed on the four entities. The Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that its strategic capabilities are meant primarily to protect its sovereignty and preserve stability in the South Asia region. The statement further claims that U.S. actions “not only undermine the credibility of non-proliferation regimes but also endanger regional and international peace and security.” This is not the first time that the United States has imposed sanctions on Pakistan’s missile program. The Biden administration imposed sanctions in the past year on entities supplying missile-applicable items to the ballistic missile program, including several companies in China and one in Belarus. These entities provided equipment to the NDC for Pakistan’s long-range missile program. One such example is that of RIAMB (Beijing Research Institute of Automation for Machinery Industry), a company in China involved in the procurement of equipment to test large rocket motors, including the Shaheen-III and the Ababeel missile. Pakistan criticized the linkages to China’s commercial entities, rejecting the “political use of export controls” with insufficient evidence from the United States. The most recent sanctions imposed on Pakistan target mention the Shaheen series missiles. These are medium-range ballistic missiles, the longest-range missiles in Pakistan’s arsenal capable of carrying nuclear and conventional payloads. Pakistan is working to equip the Shaheen-III with multiple independent reentry vehicles, or MIRVs, to counter India’s missile defense capability. U.S. officials confirmed that Pakistan’s capability to deploy such long-range ballistic missiles capable of targeting the United States was “several years to a decade away.” As the United States unveiled sanctions, India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated that India would follow all developments related to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program “which have a bearing on our security and interest very closely” and “take action as appropriate.” Weeks after the sanctions were announced, India and Pakistan exchanged the list of their nuclear assets under the nonnuclear aggression agreement, which prevents them from attacking their respective nuclear facilities. Several days later, the United States lifted restrictions on Indian nuclear entities in an effort to deepen nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States. China, considered Pakistan’s “all-weather” ally, has yet to respond to sanctions imposed by the United States on Pakistan entities and has provided no formal responses to U.S. sanctions over the past year. Its last recorded acknowledgment of the involvement in Pakistan’s ballistic missile program was in 2018 when China reportedly sold Pakistan an advanced tracking system to improve ballistic missile capability, revealed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, linked to the State Council of China. China faces its own sanctions battles with the United States, including sanctions against seven companies over U.S. military assistance to Taiwan. Chinese government hackers allegedly hacked the U.S. Department of the Treasury office in charge of economic sanctions. U.S. policymakers will need to keep a close watch on the actions taken by China in response to the sanctions. Islamabad’s Intentions A major question about the recent sanctions imposed on the Pakistan entities is, what are Pakistan’s intentions with this capability? Two potential drivers for Pakistan’s missile developments led to the U.S. sanctions. The first driver could be domestic. Historically, Pakistan directs its missile developments towards its adversary, India, with which it shares a long history of border disputes and deep-seated mistrust. Pakistan intended its nuclear weapons program to address the conventional weakness it faces with India and to address the security challenges emerging from India’s nuclear deterrent. Pakistan has historically placed a high value on its nuclear weapons as a means of survival. A recent statement by the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs called Pakistan’s strategic program a “sacred trust bestowed by 240 million people upon its leadership.” The development may have come out of the domestic push to ensure survival and signal to Pakistan’s public it is capabilities to defend against potential threats, though public opinion and discourse remain underreported. Pakistan does not publish a nuclear doctrine, and no public statements indicate a shift in policy from addressing the security concerns with India towards targeting the United States or focusing on the United States as a threat. The second driver could be regional. This driver emerges from Pakistan’s missile developments aimed at strengthening its nuclear deterrent and addressing threats from India. Pakistan’s missile developments continue to focus on countering India’s emerging nuclear capabilities. One example is the Shaheen III missile, the new version in the Shaheen ballistic missile series, which reportedly covers not just the Indian mainland but target islands in the Indian Ocean where Pakistan claims India might consider placing weapons. To counter India, Pakistan could argue that India’s developments of long-range missiles, not to mention its intercontinental-ballistic-missile capabilities such as the MIRV-capable Agni-V, require Pakistan to consider strengthening its own nuclear deterrent. Pakistan’s development indicates that the capability has spillover effects beyond the South Asia region and the Indian Ocean. Some U.S. experts point out that the development of a large rocket motor does not mean that Pakistan is developing a missile capable of solely targeting the United States. It may intend to use the motor for other developments. Jeffery Lewis indicates that Pakistan could use these motors for intermediate-range ballistic missiles or space launchers. Large rocket motors are also useful for MIRVs, making the missile suitable to carry them but the reasons why Pakistan wants it are unclear. Several Pakistan experts criticized the U.S. decision to impose sanctions against the Pakistani entities, pointing to the existing nuclear environment and ongoing strategic competition in the South Asia region which the U.S. sanctions oversimplified. Experts also described the sanctions as “divorced from the South Asia strategic realities.” However, a broader question arises from this development on why Pakistan wants the large rocket motor if it already has the capability to reach targets in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s development of this capability and the subsequent sanctions could impact regional stability in South Asia, which could stem greater mistrust between India and Pakistan. The effect of these sanctions on Pakistan’s missile capabilities and whether this will deter Pakistan requires close monitoring. The United States previously imposed sanctions on entities associated with Pakistan’s missile program. However, this round of sanctions includes declassified information on a rocket motor that can target the United States, indicating concerns over increasing missile proliferation. Through the sanctions, it is evident that allegations of Chinese involvement in Pakistan’s ballistic missile program highlight U.S. concerns over Pakistan’s close relationship with China. On the other hand, Pakistan must balance the sanctions imposed on entities such as the NDC while strengthening its deterrent and addressing security challenges from India. Some Pakistani experts claim that the sanctions are meant to exert more pressure on China over the involvement of Chinese entities in the missile program and that Pakistan’s missile program will continue to develop despite the sanctions imposed over the past year. The sanctions could push Pakistan to potentially increase its reliance on China and find avenues to continue the development of its strategic capabilities. Strategic Engagement with South Asia As the sanctions come into effect, U.S. policymakers will need to pay close attention to potential countermeasures that Pakistan will adopt to go around the U.S. sanctions. Despite sanctions on entities supporting the program, Pakistan continues to ramp up its missile developments. This will exacerbate a turbulent relationship between the two countries, amidst the U.S.-India defense partnership and China’s closeness to Pakistan. Moreover, developments between the United States and Pakistan will impact Pakistan’s relationship with India, adding to the existing tensions. Pakistan and India’s pursuit of advanced capabilities accelerates the region’s missile race. India’s recent tests of the hypersonic missile and a nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarine, as well as Pakistan’s missile developments, underscore this escalation in the region. The U.S. sanctions on Pakistan’s missile program also indicate that the United States needs to pay more attention to the developments occurring in the South Asia landscape which include (1) the development of Pakistan’s capabilities and if the sanctions deter, (2) China’s role in the missile development going forward, (3) Pakistan’s tensions with India, and (4) geopolitical impact with potential spillover effects. As the new administration addresses its security concerns with Pakistan, it will need to consider how to manage the emerging threat and how this broadens the U.S. threat environment. Recently, senior U.S. officials revealed that the United States proposed several CBMs, with Pakistan to engage in information sharing on ballistic missile testing and setting limits on the missile tests, which were rejected by Pakistan. However, South Asia has a long-winded history of implementing CBMs between India and Pakistan. This includes success and failures, particularly institutionalization and implementation of these measures. The new administration needs to carefully examine its approach to CBMs with Pakistan. This requires scrutiny of previous CBMs adopted in the region. The United States should leverage its positive defense relationship with the Indian government to (1) draw out best practices towards CBMs and (2) forge effective ways to engage with Pakistan on CBMs to address U.S. concerns over missile procurement activities. The measures could incentivize Pakistan to provide clarity over the developments of the rocket motor. Since the Pakistani government claims that the missile is meant for preserving regional stability in South Asia and not the United States, the measure provides Pakistan an avenue to share its intentions on the rocket motor technology. The new administration should also utilize findings from the Track II dialogues between India and Pakistan to develop a more nuanced approach. These dialogues provide the two countries with opportunities to address concerns over bilateral ties and build mutual confidence. Track II dialogues also provide India and Pakistan avenues to discuss growing nuclear escalation. Nongovernmental organizations such as BASIC recently conducted Track II dialogues with India and Pakistan and provided inputs on nuclear risk reduction and crisis management. These include ways to strengthen communication, areas of cooperation, and updates to existing CBMs. These help the United States not only with its approach toward Pakistan but also in thinking about its broader strategic engagement with South Asia. The United States now needs to turn its focus to the nuclear developments taking place in South Asia, particularly the growing missile race. While the United States should continue to push for dialogues with Pakistan, it must maintain a strong defense partnership with India, especially over their shared security concerns about China in the Indo-Pacific. This dynamic is further complicated by Pakistan’s increasing closeness to China and regional escalation which could potentially draw in the United States into future conflicts. The developments in this region clearly have an impact beyond South Asia’s borders, making it crucial for the United States to engage with India and Pakistan separately on the concerns, now more than ever.