Presently, the future of arms control looks bleak. Following its illegal re-invasion (Russia invaded the region of Crimea in 2014) of Ukraine in 2022, Russia suspended its participation in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and froze the United States-Russia Strategic Stability dialogue. At the same time, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never signed a bilateral arms control treaty with the US. In November 2023, the U.S. and the PRC engaged in talks on arms control, but no concrete steps for an agreement have resulted, and follow-up discussions have not been announced. Considering these circumstances, formal bilateral agreements between the U.S. and its nuclear peer competitors do not seem likely in the near term. However, during this time, the U.S. should still pursue efforts that would lay the groundwork for discourse for arms control negotiations in the long term. Importance of a Tailored Arms Control Approach toward Russia The U.S. and Russia (formerly the USSR during the Cold War) have signed formal arms control treaties since the late 20th century. However, in recent years, Russia has frequently violated its arms control obligations. In early 2023, Russia suspended its participation from New START, and earlier this year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that Russia would not engage with the U.S. on strategic arms control talks unless Washington changed its stance on Ukraine. The U.S.—rightfully so—will not cater to these demands, so the likelihood of any US-Russia discussion on arms control remains extremely slim in the short term. Most recently, the U.S. discovered that Russia is attempting to develop a space-based nuclear weapon that could destroy satellites. It is important to note that anti-satellite weapons are not new, and that Russia has not violated the 1967 Outer Space Treaty as it has not deployed the weapon in space. Nevertheless, given the current threat environment, the U.S. and its allies should respond steadfastly should Russia violate its commitment to the 1967 treaty. Acknowledging that the future of U.S.-Russia strategic arms control will heavily depend on the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine and taking into account that Russia has consistently violated several of its commitments, the US should plan for tailored arms control approaches with Russia after Russia’s war in Ukraine ends. Tailoring such efforts would ensure that—in a post war future—the two states are taking gradual steps towards rebuilding confidence and, as signatories, are remaining compliant with the arms control obligations. Specifically, these efforts should include forethinking ways of engaging Russia to re-enter treaties like New START as well as identifying strategic risk reduction measures, communicating crisis management mechanisms, and—to make sure all parties are remaining committed to the agreements—investing in and researching new verification technologies. These endeavors will provide the basis for re-starting formal arms control when circumstances allow in the long-term. Importance of Talking: Risk reduction measures with the PRC Last November, the U.S. held long anticipated discussions with the PRC on nuclear arms control, making it the first of such discourse in five years. Nonetheless, no concrete steps for a bilateral agreement have resulted. Considering that the PRC has predominantly refused to engage in any bilateral dialogue regarding arms control for the better part of the last five years, government officials and nuclear experts have discerned that it is unlikely that a formal arms control treaty will be signed between the US and the PRC in the near future. Nonetheless, given that the PRC will potentially possess over 1,000 operational warheads by 2030, and will likely become a nuclear peer competitor of the U.S., the latter should continue pressing for more informal discussions regarding arms control and have risk-reduction measures with the PRC. These can include missile launch notifications, data exchanges for emerging and disruptive technology, and U.S.-China bilateral visits to verification sites. These mechanisms can provide the groundwork for formal arms control agreements between the two nations in the long-term by gradually building mutual trust. Arms Control Doesn’t Replace Credible Deterrence In the nuclear strategy space, there are two major schools of thought: the arms control community and the deterrence community. The arms control school of thought advocates for utilizing diplomacy between two or more states to limit the development, production, deployment, or use of weapons. On the other hand, proponents of deterrence support that one’s state possesses the capabilities that would deter an adversary from taking an unwanted action. In an era of strategic competition, these two communities must identify ways to couple the two. While the U.S. should prepare the fundamentals which would lead to re-engaging with its nuclear peer competitors on strategic arms control in the long term, it should not abandon its efforts to maintain a credible deterrence and modernize its existing nuclear force posture. Ensuring that arms control is coupled with a credible deterrence will provide a greater likelihood of maintaining strategic stability. Arms control is important: it can enhance strategic stability, serve as a damage limitation apparatus, and increase transparency between states. While at present, engaging with Russia and pursuing formal agreements with the PRC seem unlikely, the US should take concrete steps to plan for such dialogue with each of its nuclear peer competitors in the long term. In short, arms control cannot be dead, and it needs some creative transformation to be revitalized. Alvina Ahmed is a Defense Fellow with the Young Professionals of Foreign Policy’s Rising Expert Program. She also serves as a Nuclear Risk Reduction Fellow with the Nolan Center on Strategic Weapons at the Council on Strategic Risks and as a program analyst in the US Department of the Navy. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, or the US Government.