This series—featuring scholars from the Futures Lab, the International Security Program, and across CSIS—explores emerging challenges and opportunities that NATO is likely to confront after its 75th anniversary. In the future, NATO should engage in a more structured public education campaign to maintain public support for its defense policies, strategy toward Ukraine, and nuclear mission and counter Russian disinformation campaigns. Although current levels of public support are at an all-time high, this is at risk of declining without an adequate level of education and information about the alliance’s approach, policies, and purpose. The Public-Elite Information Gap The war in Ukraine is in its third year, with no end in sight. What was supposed to be a swift invasion for Russian president Vladimir Putin has turned into a prolonged and grueling war of attrition, characterized by relentless combat, heavy casualties, and significant material losses on both sides. The conflict is the ugly reality of Putin’s autocratic aggressions, willingness to shatter international norms, and interest in territorial conquest that might transcend Ukrainian borders. As both Kyiv and Moscow engage in a protracted struggle, Ukrainian partners face increasing pressure to provide support and find a resolution, while the human and economic tolls continue to mount. European policy analysts, government officials, and security experts understand that the war in Ukraine is part of a much larger problem of rising global division between “two coalescing, rival coalitions”: that of advanced democracies (the United States and its regional allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific) versus autocracies such as Russia and China, with an additional group of countries that are avoiding choosing a side (e.g., Brazil, India, and Saudi Arabia). NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg stated that “it would be a tragedy for the Ukrainians if President Putin wins in Ukraine, but it would also be dangerous for us.” However, average citizens that are not as informed on these complex issues may not consider the ripple effects of the situation in Ukraine to the same extent as security experts do: how aggression in Europe could inspire imitation in another region, how autocratic countries are moving closer together, or how nuclear deterrence will be put to an even tougher test if NATO territory is involved. To ensure that policies align with public support, NATO and other decisionmakers should engage with citizens through educational programs and outreach initiatives to enhance understanding of European defense and nuclear policies. Public Attitudes on Defense and Nuclear Policies Currently, public attitudes remain highly in favor of NATO and its current defense policies. European publics have been incredibly supportive of Ukraine, and this backing remains high. About 74 percent of NATO member publics favor maintained or increased defense spending. A majority of the German public now agrees with the necessity of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads. The Dutch public similarly saw more value in nuclear deterrence in June 2022 than it did in September 2020. And Swedish and Norwegian public support for joining NATO further emphasizes the attraction of the military alliance’s defense umbrella. As social psychology research indicates, wars—such as the one in Ukraine—generate strong affective responses, subsequently triggering powerful shifts in attitudes among populations. The high support for NATO because of the Ukraine war is one example. However, since the invasion in February 2022, backing for certain European foreign policies related to the war has decreased. Public support for military aid has steadily declined in Europe and the United States. Ultimately, the public is experiencing the costs of the war through rising gas prices, high market prices and inflationary trends, and the offering of refuge to nearly 6 million people (as of July 2024), affecting public attitudes toward defending Ukraine. These adjustments come with a different cost: the erosion of public support for European security policies as the war drags on. As Czech foreign minister Jan Lipavsky put it last year, the war will “put a lot of pressure on societies, on governments.” The longer the war goes on, the more likely it is that public disapproval increases—especially when there are few immediate prospects for a solution. This concept of war-weariness, as scholars have termed it, is especially pronounced in democratic nations because news and information from the war are more likely to reach them. This means that Europe and its democratic partners are especially at risk of experiencing fatigue in aiding Ukraine and supporting defense measures. Attitudes toward global nuclear issues are in constant flux, influenced by the discourses, practices, and behaviors of states, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions. Discussions that reach European citizens are particularly important in the realm of defense, especially concerning nuclear issues. As academics have found, in case of “an absence of public debate [there] is a widespread doubt about the usefulness of nuclear weapons reflected in the public opinion in a number of European countries.” Thus, the disapproval can extend from NATO’s defense policies to its nuclear mission if public discussions of these issues are absent from society. Bringing the purpose of NATO’s defense mission closer to the people could enhance their understanding of these complex issues while addressing skepticism regarding the utility of NATO’s nuclear weapons. After all, shortly before the invasion of Ukraine, nuclear-hosting states Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands supported (62–70 percent) a ban on nuclear weapons. If NATO aims to gather public support for its nuclear mission, it will have to engage with the publics. The Importance of Public Attitudes Research findings and governments alike recognize the importance of understanding citizen views on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and foreign policy at large. For example, the Directorate-General Communication Public Opinion Monitoring Unit of the European Parliament is observing polling data closely, recognizing that the insights from surveys into how citizens see Russia’s war against Ukraine and its ripple effects are critical. Similarly, NATO has conducted public surveys since its founding in 1949 because it “derives its legitimacy from the ongoing support of its member countries and their populations.” Academics have long argued that public opinion on foreign policy—the sentiment of civil society—matters a great deal in democratic countries. Vocal debates among citizens, journalists, and activists are important to the governmental decisionmaking process and can affect foreign policy by incentivizing incumbents and shaping who gets elected. Further, decisionmakers have more room for maneuverability if the public supports their security and defense policies. Decisionmakers are often disconnected from the sentiments of citizens who are more likely to bear the direct costs of war, such as serving in the military or facing economic hardships due to increased taxation or resource allocation. Wealthier individuals and the elite often advocate for militaristic policies, while the less affluent bear the consequences for these. Therefore, to ensure that policies align with public support, decisionmakers, including those in NATO, should foster a dialogue with regular citizens to help them understand defense and nuclear policies. Pathways to Educate NATO Publics First, NATO might want to consider developing educational programs and outreach initiatives in NATO member states to raise public awareness about NATO defense policies and the role of nuclear weapons within NATO’s security framework. For example, NATO could collaborate more with local educational institutions and civil society organizations to organize seminars, workshops, and public discussions on nuclear issues to enhance public understanding and engagement. This can (a) build on NATO’s existing educational and communication efforts to establish additional forums where citizens can directly engage with policymakers and nuclear experts to discuss NATO’s nuclear posture and (b) encourage the participation of diverse stakeholders, including academic institutions, think tanks, and nongovernmental organizations, in policy discussions to promote a more informed and inclusive debate on nuclear issues. Second, NATO leadership can urge its member states to increase public debate around defense and nuclear issues. In some member states, nuclear issues are removed from public debate due to the absence of media debates and civil society organizations that focus on these issues. Hence, there exists a knowledge vacuum that leads to misunderstanding of defense missions. In Germany and the Netherlands, where nuclear weapons take a more prominent role in the public discourse, the publics are more supportive of NATO’s nuclear posture. In other member states where public debate is largely absent (e.g., in Italy and Belgium), NATO may want to encourage more dialogue between citizens and their elected officials and civil society organizations. Third, NATO will want to consider reaching out to states outside of the alliance to convey its missions and counter mounting Russian disinformation campaigns. Within Russia, citizens are being taught that the Western military alliance is seeking world domination and poses the same existential threat as Nazi Germany during World War II. Outside of Russia, Moscow has engaged in extensive disinformation campaigns across Europe, aiming to influence public opinion, destabilize governments, and undermine trust in democratic institutions. These efforts have been multifaceted, leveraging both traditional media and digital platforms to spread misinformation, amplify divisive content, and promote pro-Russian narratives. NATO should continue to invest in international outreach activities and diplomatic efforts globally, such as the annual NATO Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation, as well as other relevant platforms of international institutions such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, thereby reducing the likelihood of additional states pursuing nuclear weapons and mitigating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Conclusion In sum, NATO should anticipate and prepare for changing public sentiment toward the war in Ukraine and the alliance’s approach. As the global order returns to a more divided world characterized by great power nuclear crises and a new nonalignment, public support will be crucial to maintain unity among advanced democracies. If NATO member states fail to explain and justify their reliance on nuclear weapons and defense reinforcements, the European publics might return to their skepticism of nuclear deterrence and the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. In turn, reduced public support would present yet another challenge for policymakers in defending the liberal order. Doreen Horschig is an associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for the Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.