Nikitin and Kerr offer a review of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, its history with proliferation, and the regional implications of its weapons.
A country-by-country breakdown produced by the Arms Control Association on the state of past and current arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that each state has or has not subscribed to. The profiles also describe the primary weapons programs, policies, and proliferation record of each country.
A free online course by the Stimson Center on nuclear security challenges specific to the South Asia region. The course is designed to “provide strategic analysts in India, Pakistan, and elsewhere a platform to study and assess nuclear dangers on the subcontinent.”
The second conference of the 2017-2018 PONI Conference Series will be held on October 11-12 at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana in partnership with Global Strike Command.
Since February of this year, U.S. officials have criticized Russia for deploying a new dual capable ground-launched cruise missile prohibited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. According to General Paul Selva, ‘the Russians have deliberately deployed it in order to pose a threat to NATO.’
It may seem clear that – at the very least – technology-based sanctions slow technical progress and raise procurement costs. However, other research suggests that sanctions have improved North Korea’s ability to procure WMD-related goods.
Modernization and expansion of the INF treaty would not only address Russia’s perceived threats, but also provide security assurances to U.S. allies, preserve an important signaling mechanism, and strengthen the nonproliferation regime.
At a time of a qualitative reordering of the Asia-Pacific, stability in the Indian Ocean region hinges on collaborative efforts by India and the United States to keep the seas open and peaceful.
The Russian Federation’s future nuclear posture is dependent on its relative economic strength, the development of strategy by its leaders, and the use of unconventional forces to achieve the state’s priorities.
The Trident system is a key operational component of the NATO deterrent architecture, and without an effective infrastructure to support Trident, NATO may find itself in the new, and unenviable position of relative nuclear weakness.