Since February of this year, U.S. officials have criticized Russia for deploying a new dual capable ground-launched cruise missile prohibited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. According to General Paul Selva, ‘the Russians have deliberately deployed it in order to pose a threat to NATO.’
It may seem clear that – at the very least – technology-based sanctions slow technical progress and raise procurement costs. However, other research suggests that sanctions have improved North Korea’s ability to procure WMD-related goods.
Modernization and expansion of the INF treaty would not only address Russia’s perceived threats, but also provide security assurances to U.S. allies, preserve an important signaling mechanism, and strengthen the nonproliferation regime.
At a time of a qualitative reordering of the Asia-Pacific, stability in the Indian Ocean region hinges on collaborative efforts by India and the United States to keep the seas open and peaceful.
The Russian Federation’s future nuclear posture is dependent on its relative economic strength, the development of strategy by its leaders, and the use of unconventional forces to achieve the state’s priorities.
The Trident system is a key operational component of the NATO deterrent architecture, and without an effective infrastructure to support Trident, NATO may find itself in the new, and unenviable position of relative nuclear weakness.
With the possibility that China will deploy its JIN-class submarine fleet during this contentious time, dialogue between the US and China has become evermore important in order to avoid misunderstandings that could lead to escalation to conventional or even a nuclear confrontation.
Both South Korea and Turkey enjoy explicit nuclear guarantees. Yet under the Obama administration, relations with each have lurched to opposite ends of the ‘reassurance spectrum.’ As a result, both feel less secure than they should.
There are currently five NWFZs, which have been bound by international treaties signed by all states in those respective regions. The idea of a Middle East NWFZ has been around for nearly forty years, when Iran first proposed it in 1974.
To develop the strongest possible nuclear deterrent, the Modi administration should maintain the NFU, and continue previous administrations’ efforts with regards to survivability. Policy changes to address credibility and command and control problems could also help strengthen the deterrent.