CSIS European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues

On March 16, 2018, CSIS released the consensus statement for the 2017 round of the European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues. Read the complete statement, “CSIS European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues: 2017 Consensus Statement.”

Background on the Dialogues

Though the United States, United Kingdom, and France often meet bilaterally with one another, they rarely meet in a trilateral forum—either officially or unofficially—to discuss nuclear issues. In 2009, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) established the European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues to promote trilateral understanding and cohesion on nuclear issues, enhance scholarship on the emerging challenges these long-critical allies face, and provide insight to policymakers, experts, and the public about the evolving nature and future of the American, British, and French (P3) security partnership. The potential of such cooperation has taken on additional importance as the global nuclear landscape shapes up to be more complex than it has been in some time and presents novel challenges for NATO in general and the P3 in particular.

In 2017, the CSIS European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues, in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), once again brought together high-level “Track 2” nuclear experts from the three countries for meetings in Chantilly, France, and Washington, D.C. This year’s dialogue explored pressing nuclear issues within the Euro-Atlantic security environment and produced a statement reflecting the consensus views of the undersigned. The statement addresses: Russia and NATO, Iran and the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), National Nuclear Policies, North Korea, the Ban Treaty, and Nuclear Security.

The meetings were cochaired by CSIS senior adviser Rebecca Hersman and nonresident senior adviser Franklin Miller. William Caplan, program coordinator and research assistant, provided general support to the project.

This material is based upon work supported by the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration under Award Number(s) DE-NA0003524. This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. government. Neither the U.S. government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. government or any agency thereof.