Eric Brewer is deputy director and senior fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He specializes in nuclear proliferation, Iran, and North Korea.
Prior to joining CSIS, Mr. Brewer was a 2018-2019 Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs fellow at the Center for a New American Security. From 2017-2018, Mr. Brewer served as the director for Counterproliferation at the National Security Council (NSC), where he was responsible for coordinating U.S. policy to prevent and reverse the spread of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems, and related technologies. While at the NSC, Mr. Brewer played a lead role implementing elements of U.S. North Korea policy. From 2014 to 2017, Mr. Brewer served as deputy national intelligence officer for WMD and Proliferation at the National Intelligence Council. In that capacity, he led the Intelligence Community’s (IC) analysis of foreign nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions, proliferation trends, and over-the-horizon proliferation threats. This included IC assessments on Iran’s nuclear program during U.S. nuclear negotiations with Iran and monitoring the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. He also represented the IC in White House meetings and briefings to Congress. From 2008 to 2014, Mr. Brewer held several positions at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), including senior intelligence analyst for Iran. Before joining DIA, Mr. Brewer worked at the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Mr. Brewer is the author of several reports, including most recently “Toward a More Proliferated World? The Geopolitical Forces that Will Shape the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.” He has authored op-eds and articles in outlets such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Atlantic, and War on the Rocks. He received an M.A. in security policy studies from the George Washington University, an M.S. in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University, and a B.A. in international relations from the University of San Diego.
Returning to the deal is not only viable but also presents the best chance of preventing an Iranian bomb.
This brief reflects discussions and insights from a deep dive workshop convened by PONI at Kings Bay Submarine Base on strategic stability and great power competition in the Arctic. This brief focuses on how climate, economic, and political trends in the Arctic region impact U.S. strategic interests, and the implications of these trends for nuclear stability, policy, and posture.
Why, exactly, does Iran’s abandoned nuclear weapons program still matter for U.S. policy? Three primary reasons stand out.
For decades, America gave allies and partners good reason to shelve their nuclear weapons efforts.
This joint CNAS-CSIS report identifies seven trends that are eroding the barriers to nuclear proliferation.
The current NC3 structure, last comprehensively updated in the 1980s, was designed for a vastly different security environment.
As U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook made clear in his recent Wall Street Journal op-ed, if the United States fails to secure an extension to the arms embargo against Iran that expires in October, it is willing to try and force the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran.
The United States and Iran are once again on the verge of conflict. On March 11, a volley of short-range rockets killed a U.S. soldier and contractor, as well as a British solider, at an Iraqi base near Baghdad.
Kim Jong Un has done a good job keeping the United States guessing about his next nuclear provocation. North Korea had threatened that it would pursue a more hardline “new path” by the end of last year unless the United States dropped its “hostile” policies toward the country.
On January 5—amidst quickly escalating tensions between the United States and Iran—Tehran announced its latest steps to walk back its commitments to the 2015 nuclear deal.
Iran is back in the nuclear game.
Only a handful of countries worldwide have nuclear weapons, and the risk of new entrants into the club, most experts agree, is relatively low.
Iran’s nuclear actions so far do not merit a redline or the military response that could follow, nor do they rise to the level of an unacceptable threat to the United States or its interests. Rather, they are a signal that, although some in the Trump administration believe otherwise, Iran will not consent to being pushed via sanctions without seeking leverage of its own.
Iran announced Monday—and international inspectors confirmed—that it had exceeded the amount of enriched uranium it can have on hand under the terms of the nuclear deal (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA). The deal allows Iran to have up to 300kg of up to 3.67 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride.
ERIC BREWER and RICHARD NEPHEW