In an increasingly complex and ambiguous international security environment, it has never been more important that we ensure that the nuclear security infrastructure.
Is the balance between world security and the guarantee of continued life on this planet a possible scenario? Even if it’s not, perhaps the lesser of both evils is the right choice in this conundrum.
The successful implementation of UN Resolution 1540 depends on the committee’s ability to create an environment where member states can develop a sense of local ownership for the resolution.
With the possibility that China will deploy its JIN-class submarine fleet during this contentious time, dialogue between the US and China has become evermore important in order to avoid misunderstandings that could lead to escalation to conventional or even a nuclear confrontation.
The need to recruit and retain scientists and engineers remains a common theme among U.S. government agencies. The nuclear enterprise is no exception. Throughout the Department of Energy and Department of Defense, the colloquially named “gray beards” provide the technical expertise.
Critical questions regarding the future of the nuclear enterprise – fueled by rising global threats, questions about modernization, President Obama’s Prague legacy, and a looming nuclear posture review – will need to be addressed quickly by the next administration.
The third Kim likely hopes to use recent missile activity, and a rumored fifth nuclear test, as an attempt to shore up his image and demonstrate military power in advance of the celebration of his authority. And how has the international community responded? As usual: with sanctions.
All three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad are aging and will need large-scale, expensive modernization in the coming decades if they are to be maintained. This has prompted a discussion about the continued necessity of the nuclear triad in the post-Cold War era. Is maintaining the triad worth the money?
To develop the strongest possible nuclear deterrent, the Modi administration should maintain the NFU, and continue previous administrations’ efforts with regards to survivability. Policy changes to address credibility and command and control problems could also help strengthen the deterrent.