A video and report by the Carnegie Corporation of New York on the threat of nuclear terrorism and proliferation. The video includes many expert voices from the nuclear community, such as Toby Dalton of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Joan Rohlfing of the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
A comprehensive portal by the Federation of American Scientists connecting to numerous reports on the world’s nuclear states and arsenals. The page also includes links to issues concerning other nuclear security issues such as material security and uranium production.
The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI), Ploughshares Fund, and the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium are pleased to invite you to the third in a debate series on a range of nuclear challenges and policy decisions the Trump administration will face in 2017. The debate series aims to provide a forum for in-depth exploration of arguments on both sides of key nuclear policy issues.
The successful implementation of UN Resolution 1540 depends on the committee’s ability to create an environment where member states can develop a sense of local ownership for the resolution.
Shaping terrorist adversaries’ perceptions of U.S. security is possible, and convincing them that an attempted attack with a radiological or nuclear device would fail and would have devastating consequences should remain one of America’s highest priorities.
While it is often difficult to parse reasonable criticisms from Iran’s standard litany of anti-U.S. rhetoric, complaints that the United States is not upholding its end of the deal are not entirely unfounded. It has long been understood that the bulk of the new trade and investment that Iran could expect under the JCPOA would not come from the United States, given the extensive web of U.S. sanctions that would remain in place, but from Europe, Russia, and China.
Both South Korea and Turkey enjoy explicit nuclear guarantees. Yet under the Obama administration, relations with each have lurched to opposite ends of the ‘reassurance spectrum.’ As a result, both feel less secure than they should.
Hot off the heels of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the international community is once again abuzz with plans to secure nuclear materials and thwart the efforts of terrorists to acquire these materials. Chief among these efforts is securing nuclear and radiological materials. Are these efforts the same, though? The answer is a resounding “No.”
After sixteen months of negotiations, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached April 2, 2015 is an exceptional milestone in the thirty-six years of fraught relations between the West and the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, according to a statement delivered by President Obama outlining the JCPOA, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” and plenty of hazards exist along the way to reaching an eventual comprehensive agreement by the current talks’ stated deadline of June 30th.
There are currently five NWFZs, which have been bound by international treaties signed by all states in those respective regions. The idea of a Middle East NWFZ has been around for nearly forty years, when Iran first proposed it in 1974.