The successful implementation of UN Resolution 1540 depends on the committee’s ability to create an environment where member states can develop a sense of local ownership for the resolution.
Shaping terrorist adversaries’ perceptions of U.S. security is possible, and convincing them that an attempted attack with a radiological or nuclear device would fail and would have devastating consequences should remain one of America’s highest priorities.
While it is often difficult to parse reasonable criticisms from Iran’s standard litany of anti-U.S. rhetoric, complaints that the United States is not upholding its end of the deal are not entirely unfounded. It has long been understood that the bulk of the new trade and investment that Iran could expect under the JCPOA would not come from the United States, given the extensive web of U.S. sanctions that would remain in place, but from Europe, Russia, and China.
Both South Korea and Turkey enjoy explicit nuclear guarantees. Yet under the Obama administration, relations with each have lurched to opposite ends of the ‘reassurance spectrum.’ As a result, both feel less secure than they should.
Hot off the heels of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the international community is once again abuzz with plans to secure nuclear materials and thwart the efforts of terrorists to acquire these materials. Chief among these efforts is securing nuclear and radiological materials. Are these efforts the same, though? The answer is a resounding “No.”
After sixteen months of negotiations, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached April 2, 2015 is an exceptional milestone in the thirty-six years of fraught relations between the West and the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, according to a statement delivered by President Obama outlining the JCPOA, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” and plenty of hazards exist along the way to reaching an eventual comprehensive agreement by the current talks’ stated deadline of June 30th.
There are currently five NWFZs, which have been bound by international treaties signed by all states in those respective regions. The idea of a Middle East NWFZ has been around for nearly forty years, when Iran first proposed it in 1974.
In the aftermath of the Russian accession of Crimea in March 2014, the G8 has receded back into the G7 with the suspension of Russia from the club of industrialized economies. Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory violates a number of international laws, including Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act, a Soviet-era declaration ensuring the territorial integrity of states applied to Ukraine through the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.