Modernization and expansion of the INF treaty would not only address Russia’s perceived threats, but also provide security assurances to U.S. allies, preserve an important signaling mechanism, and strengthen the nonproliferation regime.
I’m sharing excerpts from an interview with Toshiki Fujimori, a Hiroshima bomb survivor and assistant secretary general of HIDANKYO (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations), who sits squarely in the humanitarian camp.
The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) and Ploughshares Fund are pleased to invite you to the first in a debate series on a range of nuclear challenges and policy decisions the Trump administration will face in 2017. The debate series aims to provide a forum for in-depth exploration of arguments on both sides of key Read More
CSIS President and CEO John Hamre held a Q&A with Dr. Siegfried Hecker about Hecker’s new two-volume set, Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian scientists joined forces to avert some of the greatest post-Cold War nuclear dangers. About Doomed to Cooperate An account edited by Siegfried Hecker, Doomed to Cooperate tells the story of the collaboration through the Read More
While it is often difficult to parse reasonable criticisms from Iran’s standard litany of anti-U.S. rhetoric, complaints that the United States is not upholding its end of the deal are not entirely unfounded. It has long been understood that the bulk of the new trade and investment that Iran could expect under the JCPOA would not come from the United States, given the extensive web of U.S. sanctions that would remain in place, but from Europe, Russia, and China.
Right now, the world’s attention is focused firmly on the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. But there is another country that deserves at least as much attention, if not more: North Korea. The hermit kingdom’s nuclear weapons program is looking more and more dangerous these days.
In a recent piece of nuclear news easily overshadowed by the Iran deal, teh Center for Public Integrity (CPI) highlighted new information about South Africa’s refusal to give up six bombs worth of weapons-grade uranium. In 2011 and agian in 2013, President Obama wrote letters to South African President Jacob Zuma asking him to relinquish the country’s highly-enriched uranium, to blend it down to low-enriched uranium (LEU), or to transfer it to the United States in exchang for $5 million worth of LEU. President Zuma refused.
There are currently five NWFZs, which have been bound by international treaties signed by all states in those respective regions. The idea of a Middle East NWFZ has been around for nearly forty years, when Iran first proposed it in 1974.