The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI), with the support of Northrop Grumman Corporation, hosted a half-day conference to discuss U.S. nuclear policy and strategy.
A collection of analysis pieces on the Trump Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review compiled by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).
Any decision stemming from the Nuclear Posture Review that risks derailing political support for modernization could, at the end of the day, weaken deterrence if the result is insufficient funding for the current plan.
The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) and Ploughshares Fund held a debate series on a range of nuclear challenges and policy decisions the Trump administration will face in 2017. The debate series aimed to provide a forum for in-depth exploration of arguments on both sides of key nuclear policy issues.
Since February of this year, U.S. officials have criticized Russia for deploying a new dual capable ground-launched cruise missile prohibited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. According to General Paul Selva, ‘the Russians have deliberately deployed it in order to pose a threat to NATO.’
Modernization and expansion of the INF treaty would not only address Russia’s perceived threats, but also provide security assurances to U.S. allies, preserve an important signaling mechanism, and strengthen the nonproliferation regime.
The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) and Ploughshares Fund are pleased to invite you to the first in a debate series on a range of nuclear challenges and policy decisions the Trump administration will face in 2017. The debate series aims to provide a forum for in-depth exploration of arguments on both sides of key Read More
A survey of the world today finds the nuclear landscape – from Russia, to North Korea, to India, Pakistan, and China – to be more uncertain and precarious than it has been any time since the end of the Cold War. Yet, even as nuclear dangers seem to be growing, there seems to be deepening discontent with the notion of nuclear deterrence. A growing chorus of voices questions the legitimacy of assurance and deterrence, fracturing what might have been thought at one point to be a consensus between allies. There also seems to be a growing skepticism about the benefits of the internationalist system on which deterrence, and especially extended deterrence, depends.
The Trident system is a key operational component of the NATO deterrent architecture, and without an effective infrastructure to support Trident, NATO may find itself in the new, and unenviable position of relative nuclear weakness.
Both South Korea and Turkey enjoy explicit nuclear guarantees. Yet under the Obama administration, relations with each have lurched to opposite ends of the ‘reassurance spectrum.’ As a result, both feel less secure than they should.