

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Project on Nuclear Issues

TRANSCRIPT

**The Negotiator Files: A Conversation with Rose Gottemoeller**

FEATURING

**Rose Gottemoeller**

INTERVIEWED BY

**Dr. Amy Nelson**

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Amy Nelson:

Well, we are here with the Honorable Rose Gottemoeller today. Delighted to have her in the studio. Thank you so much for being with us.

Rose Gottemoeller:

It's my pleasure, Amy. Truly.

Amy Nelson:

Wonderful. I want to start off at the beginning. Your academic background, political science, literature, Russian language, how did all of this prepare you for your career in arms control? Was this something you always thought you wanted to be doing?

Rose Gottemoeller:

I came to Georgetown University in 1971, really intent on being an interpreter at the United Nations. I thought that would be the most glamorous job possible. I entered the School of Language and Linguistics as a Russian major. And Georgetown had an intensive and famous program at that time. But I quickly learned two things. First of all, my Russian may be good, but it's never going to be at the level of a native speaker. I said, "Hmm. That's maybe not going to work to be a conference interpreter." But then second, I decided pretty quickly I didn't want to be up in the interpretation booth. I wanted to be down on the conference floor. I wanted to be part of the substantive discussions and engaged and involved on the substance of negotiations. I quickly came and kind of pivoted to think of my Russian language acquisition as an important tool to help me in my career. And indeed, it was a gateway for so much that I did in my career, starting with my very important time at the RAND Corporation as a very young analyst.

Amy Nelson:

Fantastic. And you spent some time in Moscow with Carnegie. What was that like?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Yes. Well, started out with the time in Moscow really as a Carnegie expert from 2000 on, coming and going from Moscow, doing research at the Carnegie Moscow Center, which was already at that point over a decade old. But in 2005, I was invited to go to Moscow to live for three years and be the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. I really leapt at that chance because I'd always wanted to live in Moscow. Luckily, my husband, Raymond Arnaudo, was also game, and he doesn't speak Russian, but he found a position at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, still working at the State Department. He was seconded to the Department of Energy, so he had a good spot at the Moscow Embassy, and I then dove into work at the Carnegie Moscow Center and directed that for three years. And I made an important decision early on because my Russian was a little rusty. I said, "Okay. I am going to manage this office in Russian." Because of course, I had many, many very good speakers of English, experts who are well-known in this country. But I had a lot of staff. The drivers, the accountants. They didn't speak any English. I said, "Okay. I'm going to manage this place in Russian." And it was hilarious. The first couple staff meetings, they were looking at me like, "What is this woman trying to say?" Because my Russian was so rusty. But it was a good decision because it forced me to speak Russian practically nonstop for three years and that paid huge dividends when we got to negotiation of the New START Treaty.

Amy Nelson:

Oh, wow. Fantastic. I remember once at a CFE RevCon, you were describing having dinner with your Russian counterpart, Antonov, and you conducted it all in Russian. How did the Russians react to your language capabilities?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Well, generally speaking, they ranged from polite to thrilled. I'm a non-native speaker, so I often make mistakes, but they are glad to have somebody really make the effort with their language. And of course, the more one practices a foreign language, the better one gets. I think that it has served me very, very well over time. And during negotiation of the New START Treaty Ambassador Antonov and I engaged in a kind of mixture of Russian and English because sometimes he didn't know the words in English for particularly technical issues, I didn't know the words in Russian, and so we would just have this mixed patois of English and Russian, and it actually worked very, very well for us. I think it gave us a very direct and intensive line of

communication. Of course, at a formal plenary table, you have your official interpreter by your side, and there is consecutive interpretation, and that is extraordinarily important for the record keeping in any negotiation. And it also gives each side a chance to think carefully before answering, because I deliver my points in English. They're translated into Russian. The other side has a chance to listen to them twice. And so that's the great value of having a lot of Russian speakers on the American delegation because people could listen twice to what the Russians were saying, both in Russian and in English.

Amy Nelson:

Wow. You've had a remarkable set of roles from assistant secretary of state for arms control verification compliance to chief U.S. negotiator for New START and later deputy secretary general of NATO. You said your background was originally in language. How did all of these experiences shape your thinking about deterrence and arms control and alliance management, and how did they evolve over time?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Yes, I had what I called a journeyman apprentice career in that when I went to the RAND Corporation after my undergraduate degree, I had a wonderful mentor there named Thomas Wolfe. At the time, he was the senior Soviet military analyst at a RAND Corporation's Washington office, and he was writing a book on the first strategic arms limitation agreement, SALT I. That book is called *The SALT Experience*. And he needed a research assistant who spoke and read Russian. He hired me to be his research assistant, but he also took me under his wing and really pushed me to start learning the ropes in terms of nuclear policy, nuclear arms control, deterrence, the systems that were coming online then. That was the advent of MIRV systems, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, MIRVs. And so this was all part of a big debate in that era over throw weight and how to get a constraint on Soviet throw weight at the negotiating table. These were very important burgeoning issues in the 1970s.

And thanks to Tom Wolfe, I had a kind of ringside seat because he was very involved in informal and formal advice to the government and participated in the so-called Team B exercise wherein it was a second look at intelligence information that was coming out then. Somewhat controversial, but nevertheless, because I was his research assistant and working closely with him, I had, as I said, a ringside seat to all these developments.

Amy Nelson:

That must've been fascinating.

Rose Gottemoeller:

It was. He was a very good mentor.

Amy Nelson:

And how long did you work at RAND and where'd you go from there?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Well, I worked at RAND all through the 1980s, which was very good luck for me because it was, as I said, a journeyman apprenticeship. I not only worked for Tom. He retired quite early in 1982 or so, and I went on to work on many different projects, including projects on Soviet chemical weapons policy and technology and so forth, how they were planning for chemical weapons use in a European war. had many different angles. Even the civil war in Angola, I wrote about Soviet

involvement in the civil war in Angola. It really did give me insight and knowledge and understanding about a lot of different developments, frankly, that I think I would not have gotten in a classic graduate program anywhere. There was a great deal of variety, and I got thrown into the fray. I always say that, again, my Russian language was a ticket to ride because I had all kinds of RAND researchers coming to me and saying, "Hey, I need to look at Soviet military journals. Could you help me out?"

And so it was very important from that perspective. I would say that's really how I got into the wider agenda of nuclear deterrence policy and nuclear arms control policy. It was related very much to my decade plus at the RAND Corporation.

Amy Nelson:

And you had the right skill set at the right time, it sounds like.

Rose Gottemoeller:

Right.

Amy Nelson:

Terrific. I want to move on to your arms control negotiation experience. How did you find yourself as chief U.S. negotiator for New START? What was the impetus for coming to the table?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Well, I was delighted to be invited to join the Obama administration. I had been in Moscow for three years, and as part of my experience as director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, I had decided to use that as a platform to think with the Russians about what the future of strategic arms control should be. The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START I, was going out of force in December of 2009. Again, I was in Moscow from 2006 through the end of 2008. I knew it was a prime period to consider what should come after START I. And I knew that the Russians were always very curious about the changes that happen when a Republican administration comes in versus Democratic. What was the attitude going to be toward replacing New START? I'm sorry, toward replacing the first START Treaty.

I said, "Well, let's have a regularized seminar series, and I'm going to invite as many people to Moscow as I possibly could on both sides of the aisle." I had people like Bob Joseph come, I had people like ... Oh gosh. I'm remembering Bob Joseph because that was a famous visit. But certainly I had many people from the Democratic side of the aisle come as well and talk about their vision for what should come after START I. And I think that was an important experience for the Russians to understand what the direction of travel might be when a new U.S. president would be elected in 2008, and also their chance to put some ideas into the mix as well. But it was also vital for me because it prepared me with knowledge and understanding of thinking in Moscow, but also in terms of personal contacts, because the man who became my counterpart at the negotiating table, Anatoly Antonov, was at that time directing the offices in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for arms control, nonproliferation and trade policy.

We got to know each other. We weren't friends, but we got to know each other. We'd go out to lunch from time to time. And I think that knowledge and basic acquaintanceship was very important to the fast start that Anatoly and I were able to make in negotiation of the New START Treaty.

Amy Nelson:

Fantastic. And I wonder the ability to even have that Moscow Center, to get to know your Russian counterpart, to have continuity or preparedness from one administration to the other, does that seem like golden times now? Does that seem almost quaint or normal in comparison to today?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Well, I come out of this long tradition beginning ... Don't forget I was at Georgetown in 1972 when the first detente emerged between the USSR and the United States, and I've seen the ups and downs over now decades. I tend to believe that there's nothing necessarily inherent in the current situation. And the United States and the USSR, starting with the Cuban Missile Crisis, took enormous responsibility for stability and security of nuclear weapons systems as well as their control and limitation. I think we have shared in the past a basic consensus that these weapons of mass destruction must be treated with care and must be handled carefully and must be a subject of discourse in bilateral negotiations. I happen to think that that is more the natural state than the geopolitical morass we find ourselves in now, which flows of course from the egregious invasion of Ukraine two times, first in 2014 and now in 2022 by Vladimir Putin. There's good reason why we're in this geopolitical morass, but I tend to think that the more steady state is one of focusing on trying to ensure control and limitation of nuclear weapons even when there are ups and downs in the relationship over many, many decades.

Amy Nelson:

Interesting. And also interesting that Putin does come out of this long history of bilateral reciprocity, these trust-building exercises, and as you pointed out, this shared understanding of the risks of nuclear weapons. How will that return? What do you think is going on right now that allows him to set that aside? Or is it really this lingering suspicion and mistrust of the United States that he's alluded to over the years that's really rearing its ugly head right now?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Yes. I think with Vladimir Putin, it's his feeling that he's being disrespected, dissed, so to say, by the establishment in the United States. I frankly think with Donald Trump now in the White House, that perhaps it would be a rather straightforward step to get back to some discussions of strategic stability topics and nuclear arms control topics, particularly given the fact that Mr. Trump himself is very interested in achieving a new treaty with the Russians. I happen to think it could be pretty straightforward as long as some other problems were solved. For example, the U.S. was willing to resolve the problems over the Russian diplomatic properties here in the United States. There are consulates, as in San Francisco, there are dachas in Washington region and also in New York. Simple steps like that may serve as a way to open the door to some release of this linkage that Putin imposed in February of 2023 when he said, "We are halting the implementation of New START because the United States and NATO are assisting Ukraine." But I've seen already that conditionality begin to loosen on the Russian side and so I'm beginning to think, well, it could be a kind of more or less straightforward nod in Moscow's direction, the reopening of some better diplomatic links at a routine level that could be the impetus to get back to strategic stability and nuclear talks. But we'll see. We will really see. It's quite unpredictable at this moment.

Amy Nelson:

Yeah, that's interesting. This kind of new and different set of bargaining chips the U.S. has to offer. We shall see, as you say. Getting back to New START, you've documented of course the negotiation of the treaty extensively in your book, but I would love if you could walk us through

whether there were any particularly difficult moments in the negotiations and lessons you've learned on overcoming diplomatic or technical impasses.

Rose Gottemoeller:

Difficult moments with Washington or Moscow? We need to set those two categories clearly.

Amy Nelson:

Fair, fair.

Rose Gottemoeller:

I would say the most difficult issue to wrestle with regard to Moscow was the very particular relationship at that time between the then President Dmitry Medvedev, who had a very good working relationship with Barack Obama. They participated in regular interactions, either phone calls or in-person interactions to negotiate important and difficult issues in the treaty. I give those two men great credit for getting us over some severe bumps in the road in that negotiation.

But then looming over in Moscow was the prime minister, Vladimir Putin. And it became clear after some months that Vladimir Putin was not happy that the United States and Russia had agreed in London in April of 2009 that this negotiation would be about further reductions in strategic offensive forces and would not touch missile defense at all. That forced my counterpart, Anatoly Antonov, into a difficult position. He had to start insisting that somehow constraints on missile defense had to be present in the treaty, and it wasn't possible politically for us to do so. But I also had that document from April of 2009 that Medvedev had signed up to. I was able to say again and again, "Our two presidents, they said strategic offensive forces only. We're not going to talk about missile defense." And I even had to pound my fist on the table one time to say that very loudly because he kept insisting on bringing forward missile defense constraints. In the end of the day, I would say that was the most difficult issue to deal with. And it is the one occasion when I believe Medvedev stood up to Vladimir Putin.

And it happened at the end of 2009. Around the New Year's time, he went and made a speech out in Vladivostok. I do recount this in the book. He went to Vladivostok, Putin, and made a speech basically ripping apart the negotiations and saying, "They're not dealing with missile defense. They are worthless." Etc, etc. I thought ugh. When I saw the report of it, I said, "This is it." I expected this new story to gain momentum across the time zones of Russia all the way to Moscow. But when I woke up the next morning, the story had been killed. And I am convinced that it was Medvedev who forced Putin to back down here and killed the story. Because when I woke up the next morning, the Interfax website and the TASS website, the two official websites both said, "This story has been taken down."

Amy Nelson:

Oh, interesting.

Rose Gottemoeller:

It was a remarkable episode for me and I think it may be the one time that Medvedev stood up to Putin.

Amy Nelson:

And all after you raised your and pounded the table.

Rose Gottemoeller:

Well, that was part of the dynamics through the fall. Yes. And there are other reasons why I had to do that. And that gets back to the difficult time I had with Washington. Because there were some who were not confident that I would be a sufficient ambassador, a sufficient negotiator for this particular treaty. And there were some on my delegation who urged me to show more anger at the negotiating table and to be tougher.

Frankly, I thought, "All right, I'm going to engage in little street theater to just satisfy the people on my own delegation." One day I go in, Antonov's been droning on for weeks about we need missile defense in this negotiation. And I'd always politely say, "No. Our presidents agreed not to." But this time when he, again, droned on about this, I pounded the table, brought my hand down hard and shouted at the top of my lungs, "No. This negotiation is only about strategic offensive forces." And the Russians looked astounded because I never got mad, but I could practically hear my own people behind me cheering me. And when we got to staff meeting later on, they were like, "Oh, Rose, you were great. You even turned bright red as you were shouting at the Russians." And I said, "Well, okay, maybe that satisfies them that I can get mad if I have to."

Amy Nelson:

They push you far enough.

Rose Gottemoeller:

But I have to believe that normally it's better to try to be a problem solver, try to be pragmatic, try to have an even temper at the negotiating table because then when you get mad, it really makes a difference. I got mad like that one other time on the negotiations. It was a few months later in December of 2009 and we had worked through, we'd gotten many compromises agreed. And back to Moscow had gone the Russian delegation with Antonov. And I heard later that there had been a National Security Council meeting in Moscow and everybody was signed up to all these compromises. Putin walked in the door and x-ed through one after the other. And Antonov had to come back. He called a special plenary on a Saturday, came back from Moscow and basically said, "All of these compromises are off the table." And I got mad again and I brought my hand down on the table and I shouted, "How are we going to get this negotiation done if we cannot count on you to carry forward when we come to difficult compromises on both sides?"

Of course, compromises on both sides is how you get to yes. And he said, "Well, are you questioning my president?" I said, "I'm not questioning your president. I'm just questioning our negotiating procedures here if we can't agree that we're going to move forward in this way." We did get away from that difficult period with the help frankly of Mike Mullen, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who agreed to go to Moscow in January and pick up the pieces. We had help across our government in very significant ways.

Amy Nelson:

Terrific. Thank you. You mentioned the essential component of compromise to arms control. Increasingly, it seems domestically compromise plays as weakness or losing. How do we deal with that in today's environment? What's the effect of that on potential future arms control negotiations?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Well, in any case, you're looking for compromises that also suit your purposes. And I think that that's very important to remember. And although people consider compromise a dirty word, in the end of the day, it means finding solutions that are mutually beneficial and mutually of interest.

And people always said, "Oh, here's a good example of this." People said, "You compromised too much on the inspection regime of New START and it's weaker than the START inspection regime because you have fewer inspections."

We cut down on the categories of inspections. And we said, "No, no, no, no. We thought of a different concept to bring the tasks of those different inspections together in only two categories. Yes, only two categories, but the tasks are still covered, and this is helpful to our Air Force and our Navy who were sick and tired of the multiple inspections that they had to prepare for, and they said it was getting in the way of their operational viability." When our Air Force and Navy says to us, "Figure out a way to make it easier for us to conduct, yes, correct and judicious on-site inspection mutually available to us and the Russians but help us to keep up our ops tempo." That's basically what our marching orders were, and that's why we basically simplified the overall verification regime of New START and the on-site inspection regime. It was with our Navy and our Air Force asking us to do so. You see compromises can be definitely mutually beneficial. I think that's a perfect example of that.

Amy Nelson:

Terrific. I want to come back to that when we talk about the New START ratification process, but you also have mentioned missile defenses several times and the United States famously pulled out of the ABM Treaty in the early 2000s, which seemed to irk Putin at the time. Has this been a thorn in the side of the relationship ever since?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Well, Amy, I'm going to actually question the conclusion that it was a thorn in Putin's side at the time in 2002. And if you go back and look at the history, which I actually was present in Moscow, it so happened ... I mentioned I'd go repeatedly as an expert to the Carnegie Moscow Center. I'd gone to Moscow that December and I'd requested a meeting with Marshal Sergeyev who was at that time a senior advisor to Putin in the Kremlin. And he'd granted me a meeting, and it happened to be the very day that the Bush administration notified the Russians that they were withdrawing in six months from the ABM Treaty. I thought, "Oh my Lord, I'm going to this meeting already planned, and I'll be the first American across the threshold in the Kremlin to hear what they have to say about this."

Amy Nelson:

Line of fire.

Rose Gottemoeller:

I was very nervous. It was a terrible snowstorm that day. And I got to the Kremlin. Our Carnegie driver took me to the gates of the Kremlin, but I had to walk across that gigantic ploshad'ka. If you've been in the Kremlin, from the gates to the Kremlin office building is a really big distance. I was wading through the drifts, the wind was blowing, it was snowing like mad. I get there, I brush myself off, I go inside. And indeed Marshal Sergeyev was there and his talking points were very circumspect. He said, "We're not going to overreact. We think this decision is wrong and we will respond, but we will respond in a judicious way." By essentially improving their ability to dodge our missile defenses. And they've done that with countermeasures associated with their ICBM force for many years. Since Star Wars back in the 1980s. That was the Andropov decision not to replicate Star Wars, but to build up their ability to essentially counter with ICBM and SLBM countermeasures. Anti-missile defenses.

Amy Nelson:

So the ability to offensively overwhelm defenses.

Rose Gottemoeller:

Correct. They basically are cutting the bottom out of any effort to build a comprehensive missile defense by putting in place countermeasures associated like chaff and decoys and so forth associated with their ballistic missile forces. It was very reminiscent of the Soviet response in 1983 to the original SDI program. And it was something that rung true to me from that perspective. And in his first public reactions, if you go back and look at his first public reactions, Vladimir Putin echoed those themes. It was only within the next, I would say five to 10 years, that his line about being double-crossed by the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty began to gather momentum. But he had a quite judicious response to begin with.

Amy Nelson:

Interesting. And today, of course, the United States is talking about implementing Golden Dome, more comprehensive missile defenses. Should we expect a Russian reaction and will it be judicious or reactionary?

Rose Gottemoeller:

I think it will certainly be there. There's no question about it. And they will say, "Aha. We told you they were always going to head back in the direction of SDI and a comprehensive missile defense dome over the United States." My approach to this I think is worth mentioning, and that is we shouldn't let the Russians get away with pushing us and accusing us on this issue because they too are building up very capable missile defenses. Their S-500 missile defense system is very capable and is capable against our intercontinental ballistic missiles. We need to say to them, as we did in January of 2022, right before the second invasion of Ukraine, we said to them at strategic stability talks in Geneva, "Let's sit down and talk about missile defenses and the threat that missile defenses may pose to strategic offensive deterrence at a time when both of us are developing the capability to defend against missiles." And I think this is very important now because in the war in Ukraine, we've seen a big proliferation of missile systems across the ranges, from very low range UAV systems through longer range crews and ballistic systems all the way up to intermediate range systems. And we need to talk about the requirement for integrated air and missile defenses to protect all of our homelands.

It's also a conversation we need to have with the Chinese. This is not the same kind of discussion we had in the 1980s. It's not a simple calculation about undermining strategic offensive deterrence. It's a discussion about what can we allow each other to do now to defend our own homelands at a time when we're all facing rapid and wide scale missile proliferation.

Amy Nelson:

And at the same time, rapid improvements in the technologies that can shoot down or neutralize these threats.

Rose Gottemoeller:

Correct. Absolutely.

Amy Nelson:

And so is it fair to say the question is so much more complicated now? Multiple actors, multiple systems, multiple dynamics?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Absolutely. Absolutely. But even in negotiation of the ABM Treaty back in 1972, we recognized that each party may want to protect certain high value targets. We said each party could have two sites to protect its national capital and to protect an ICBM field. The precedent is there of saying, "Okay. Yes, we are going to constrain missile defenses, but we are going to preserve each other's opportunity to protect vital targets."

Amy Nelson:

These ideas implemented, of course came out of Schelling and Halprin and this intellectual framework for arms control that advanced notions conducive to strategic stability. Do we still need those concepts or are we in a new era?

Rose Gottemoeller:

I think the concepts are basic. They're like the basic principles of physics. They're basic deterrence concepts. I think what we need to wrestle with now is the fact that we have multiple actors, multiple players. We haven't yet talked about China, but China is looming very large in concerns in Washington and among our allies. Its rapid modernization of its nuclear forces is very concerning. And we've got to think about it. Yesterday, here we are, September 3rd, 2025, we saw a big parade in Beijing where lots of modern weapons systems were marched along, including some of those advanced UAVs. Obviously we've got a threat in China to deal with.

Amy Nelson:

Should China be included in the next strategic arms negotiations?

Rose Gottemoeller:

I think they should be part of a future strategic arms control negotiations, but my personal view is it's a fool's errand to try to shoehorn them in to negotiations with the Russian Federation and the United States because they are still far from parity. They have about 600 warheads total now. The United States and Russia have 1,550 operationally deployed warheads under the New START Treaty. We're far from a situation of parity with China. My view is now conduct a negotiation with the Russians to replace New START, try to continue that process of limitation with the Russians, get back to on-site inspection and other verification measures, and with China start a parallel negotiation that talks about measures of control and risk reduction and focus on that and focus on getting them to commit not to undermine the strategic balance that is incorporated now into the New START Treaty with the limitations of the New START Treaty. And that would be incorporated presumably into any further treaty between the United States and Russia. In other words, get them to commit, not to rush to parity.

Amy Nelson:

Do you think U.S. deployment of SLCM-N could help bring China to the arms control negotiation table?

Rose Gottemoeller:

I thought that was a stupid argument for deploying SLCM-N. I'm not a big fan of SLCM-N. I know I've practically lost that battle, but to my mind, it takes away from vital Navy missions that they are struggling anyway to fulfill for deployed advanced conventional missions that they are required to fulfill. And its ability to reassure our allies in Asia somewhat at question because of the nature, again, of the mixed-use submarine force that would be a SLCM deployment force. I've

always said much, much better to concentrate on building more modern ALCMs, air-launched cruise missiles, and ensuring that we have the aircraft available in theater to deliver them if necessary and/or that we exercise regularly moving the bombers forward and being able to exercise that kind of strategic extended deterrent messaging on a regular basis. That's my preference to how to proceed. I'm just not a big fan of SLCM-N. I think it's a waste of money.

Amy Nelson:

And the Strategic Posture Commission recommendations, which had to be consensus-based, included a diverse range of opinions in the process. Can you say something about what it was like to be part of that process?

Rose Gottemoeller:

It was a very difficult 18 months, I have to say. But I will say that the executive secretariat, which was IDA or the Institute for Defense Analysis, they did a couple very clever things. We always sat at the same place around the table, and we were surrounded by the other party. I sat with Jon Kyl on my right and on my left was Lisa Gordon-Hagarty, and Jon Kyl and I tangled quite a bit during New START negotiation and ratification, so I wasn't exactly comfortable to begin with. But once again, making good policy and succeeding at negotiations is about developing good personal connections and good communications abilities. When you sit with somebody for 18 months and talk with them about not only the business at hand but also their grandchildren or how their house construction is going or whatever the issue may be, you begin to develop more of a, I would say a firm and clear communications line that's very, very productive. And there were some critical ... I will say I'm a little concerned that some of the critical compromises we reached in negotiations in the Strategic Posture Commission process have gotten muffled in Washington.

The key one, which I insisted on, was that I wouldn't just agree to a simple increase in U.S. strategic offensive forces to address the two-peer problem, the China-Russia problem. I said, "We can say we will address this problem by an increase and or a change in structure for the strategic nuclear forces." And by that I meant, and it may mean stepping out of the limits of New START, but increasing the number of available warheads by attributing more warheads to the bomber force or even moving to upload the intercontinental ballistic missile and sea launch ballistic missile force, but not building up numbers in other ways like increasing number of warheads. And that message has gotten muffled.

Amy Nelson:

Through posture and readiness, specifically.

Rose Gottemoeller:

Overall, yes, posture readiness. And really thinking hard about what deters the Chinese. I've been asking this question repeatedly and people aren't thinking any differently. They're saying, "What deterred the Russians? Let's go after war-supporting industry. Let's go after of course the leadership. Let's go after military forces." It's a very wide target base. I said, "Well, wait a minute. The Chinese for decades have focused on second strike retaliation as the core of their military nuclear doctrine." And maybe they're changing. Maybe they are. But does that mean maybe they'd be willing to accept some destruction to their war-supporting industry before they'd be willing to launch a response strike? We need to think about that, and we also need to talk to the Chinese about it and try to understand a little better how they think about nuclear targeting. Very difficult, I know, but we shouldn't just assume that they're exactly the same as the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation in this regard.

Amy Nelson:

That's a really important point. Absolutely. I want to draw you out on new types versus new kinds. You addressed this in your book. Were you satisfied with the terms you settled on for the New START Treaty? Could you elaborate on them? And is there anything you would've done differently looking back now knowing what you know, 20/20 hindsight?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Yes. Well, we did end up with a situation where the new types, essentially, they are new types of existing missiles. Fine. That was dealt with in START and so forth and so on. We've seen the emergence of all kinds of so-called exotic Russian systems. And essentially we dealt with it in the end of the day through a kind of consultation arrangement and discussion arrangement in the New START Treaty. And to be honest with you, I wish we could have gotten more to kind of force an exchange of information about new kinds because what has happened now with the geopolitical relationship falling apart, the opportunity to consult and to hear from the Russians about their exotic systems has turned to nil essentially. And I think that's a problem. We all recognize and I 100% agree that in our next negotiation, a prime objective of the United States should be to get some controls on those exotic Russian systems.

But that I think was frankly the downfall of the new kinds provision in New START. It was a fine idea. We had a wonderful relationship at that moment, in that reset moment that we all thought maybe was going to last a while. The notion of sitting down and consulting about new kinds of exotic weapons systems seemed like okay, if this is what we can get, this is what we can get. But now when things have gone badly, I think we'll have to really focus on this issue hard, assuming we get to the negotiating table again.

Amy Nelson:

What is the lesson from this for future arms control negotiators? INF similarly was negotiated during a time when there was as great cordiality among all sides negotiating, tensions were relaxed and there was almost a sense that no one could imagine the kinds of changes that would come. How do you-

Rose Gottemoeller:

That's right. Well, we can't. We're humans without perfect foresight of the future. If we had perfect foresight, we'd be Gods not humans.

Amy Nelson:

Fair enough.

Rose Gottemoeller:

We do have to address that. Always I say when people question the utility of arms control negotiations and agreements and treaties, I say, "Well, think about the national security interest for the foreseeable future and whether this serves our national security interest for the foreseeable future." I would argue New START has served our interests in creating that predictability with the Russian Federation. We did not foresee the number of exotic kinds, but at least we have been able to keep their modernizing forces under control. The new kinds are still very few numbers. And where they have sunk their modernization investment is into more mobile missiles and modernizing the fixed ICBM force with the Sarmat, etc, etc. These are all predictable systems. We have kept them under control, and we've been able to see their direction of travel with regard to those modernizations. I think that is important for U.S. national security. That's the basic

calculus you have to make. I always point that out, but for the future, we need to learn from the past. And I'll give you the example of the INF Treaty. The notion that we could close out the monitoring regime after a while I think was the wrong idea because we saw what happened with the Russians cheating in developing the 9M729 and beginning to deploy it around 2013, 2014.

And again, we could not have foreseen that, but we needed to have some at least ... I would say perhaps not the same kind of intensive inspection regime we had under the INF Treaty, but a kind of maintenance regime where we had the opportunity to do, for example, challenge inspections, which are always problematic, but at least to have them on the books might have helped us to avoid what we ended up with the Russian INF violation.

Amy Nelson:

That's an important lesson. Thank you. You've just negotiated New START and these Russian potential violations land on your desk at the State Department. Can you walk us through what that was like, how you came to be concerned about the issue and what the process of dealing with it was for you?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Right. Well, unfortunately in this case, it took us a while to understand that it was actually a violation of the INF Treaty because for a long time we did not understand that they were testing from a fixed launcher. And how we came to discern and determine that was related to some intelligence sources and methods that were very constraining. When I went to the Russians and began to talk to them about this in the 2012-13 timeframe, they simply denied anything was going on. I was quite hamstrung by, again, very important constraints placed by the intelligence community because they did not want to give up sources and methods. And here is a case where I give huge credit to the Trump administration in their first term because they did go to all of our allies. I was sitting at NATO at this point. I did watch as they went to all of our allies and essentially shared that critical intelligence.

And they convinced every one of our allies that the Russians were in fact violating the INF Treaty. And that was so important. I give the Trump administration huge credit for bringing all the allies along so that when it came time to notify the Russians that we were withdrawing from the treaty in 2019, every single ally stood together and said, "We agree. This is an egregious violation of the INF Treaty." All of the allies stood behind us, and that was a super important message to Moscow. I think there are cases where for good reasons, diplomacy is constrained. I felt quite hamstrung, honestly, trying to make the case to the Russians and trying to push them to come clean on this violation. But in the end of the day, the willingness to share some information, which still to this day would not be appropriate to share with the Russians, I think, but to share it with our allies I think was very important.

Amy Nelson:

Interesting. And for our viewers, you mentioned the nature of the violation was this intermediate range missile being tested from a fixed launcher. How does that amount to a treaty violation?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Well, cruise missiles come in all varieties, right? Sea-launched, air-launched and ground-launched. The ones that are constrained by the INF Treaty are the ground-launched intermediate range systems. As long as the Russians were testing them in various ways that were consistent with an air-launched or a sea-launched system, fine, they could deploy a new system, a SLCM or an ALCM. That would not violate the INF Treaty. But once they started testing it from a fixed

launcher, it was a signal and a symbol that they were going after a ground-launched cruise missile, and that's when we determined that it was a violation of the treaty.

Amy Nelson:

That would've exceeded the limits of the treaty.

Rose Gottemoeller:

It would've exceeded the limits. Yes, they were testing beyond the limits of the INF Treaty, which is 500 ... Let's see if I can remember properly. 500 to 5,500 kilometers in range.

Amy Nelson:

Great. Thank you. On New START, of course, the treaty is set to expire in 2026. It was originally negotiated with the provision that it could be extended for five years. Would you do it the same way again, or would you allow the treaty to be extended indefinitely, for example, or for another five years?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Well, for one thing, people have been arguing about some kind of special agreement to extend the New START Treaty again for five years. I don't actually support that because I think for political reasons, it's very important the next treaty be very much a Donald J. Trump treaty and Vladimir V. Putin treaty. It has to step into this new era that we are experiencing now with Trump in the lead. And that's why I've been arguing that there are some building blocks in New START we should hold onto. I think the verification regime is actually very fit for purpose and we should hold onto that and not bother to try to renegotiate the verification regime related to delivery vehicles. But rather we should focus on new constraints on warheads and focus our negotiation on monitoring for warheads, which is going to be a difficult task and will be really stepping into new territory. So just bring forward the delivery vehicle on-site inspection and other verification measures from New START. They're fit for purpose. Focus on what we need to monitor warheads and constrain warheads in the new treaty. And that would be Trump's big contribution to the future of limitation and control of nuclear weapons.

And he's already started down that path by getting Putin to agree to a freeze on all warheads, deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic back in 2019. If he can renew that pledge to freeze warheads with Mr. Putin, that would be a great first step in my view. And that should be the new work that goes on in this treaty negotiation. But otherwise, the monitoring regime for warheads is fine.

Amy Nelson:

So this new treaty then should be a total warhead agreement?

Rose Gottemoeller:

I believe it should. I believe it should because that's how we get at the differential. That is the Russians devote more of their non-deployed warheads to non-strategic or tactical mission and we of course devote more of ours to strategic missions and we don't have the same focus on non-strategic nuclear warheads, which has been a political concern and a strategic concern for many, many years. And it's actually a legal requirement on the United States. It's inserted in the resolution of ratification of New START that in our next negotiation with the Russians, we try to get a handle on their non-strategic nuclear warheads. There are many reasons why we should place that as a priority for our next negotiations.

Let me just address though the limitations of New START. At this moment, when we are continuing to modernize our nuclear arsenal, our triad under the so-called program of record, it will stretch from now for the next 10 years plus to the late 2030s into the 2040s, honestly. But just for the next decade, I think it would be very valuable to sustain that predictability with the Russians and ensure that they do not sprint away from us because they have modernized their ICBM force already. They are deploying missiles like the Sarmat, albeit slowly. But systems that they could upload rapidly. And we would see them sprinting away from us in terms of deployed warheads if we're not careful. We need to prevent the Russians from engaging in a warhead upload campaign.

And the way to do that is to get them to agree for the time being to maintain the limitations of the New START Treaty. I know this is very controversial. There are many good people who are arguing against it, but I think we have time, we have a window of opportunity to try to get the Russians back to the negotiating table and most importantly, at this moment in history, to engage the Chinese for the first time. That window of opportunity extends for the next decade. Under the program of record, we build and deploy uploadable, rapidly uploadable ballistic missiles, both air ... I'm sorry, both sea launched and our ICBM force. We build them to be rapidly uploadable. They're our insurance policy because we have the warheads. If we need to upload at the end of this decade, we can do so. But in the meantime, we have time to try to keep the Russians under control and to get the Chinese to acknowledge the necessity of control and begin to come into the process.

So I really see the next 10 years as that window of opportunity, and we should use it.

Amy Nelson:

That's really interesting. Thank you. Have folks on the hill been receptive to that idea?

Rose Gottemoeller:

I'm not sure folks on the Hill have been receptive to the idea, but in the executive branch, people are collecting ideas of all kinds. And I think the debate is there. I think there will continue to be a debate and discussion of this matter. And the president I know wants a new strategic arms treaty. Myself, I wouldn't want to be the staffer who goes to him and says, "Boss, we need to increase nuclear weapons." I'm not sure that's a message he wants to hear.

Amy Nelson:

You can't have what you want.

Rose Gottemoeller:

I think the idea of at least removing those limits from the New START Treaty and making them part of a Trump treaty, but essentially hanging onto them for predictability's sake, and again, to avoid this upload campaign on the Russian side, could be something that could be accomplished rather easily. And by the way, if any president can get a new strategic arms treaty ratified through the ratification process on Capitol Hill, it would be Mr. Trump. People have said, "Oh, we'll never get another treaty." I don't believe that with this president. I think he could get a treaty if he wanted to.

Amy Nelson:

I want to come back to this idea of a total warhead agreement, and you've written extensively about freedom to mix. Can you describe what that is for our viewers and why it's such a valuable concept here?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Yes. Freedom to mix is a very valuable concept with regard both to delivery vehicles, but also I would argue going forward with regard to warheads. In the U.S.-Soviet context, we came in the SALT II process to agree to the notion of parity. That we would essentially have equivalent numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in our two forces. Strategic offensive delivery vehicles. But each side then could decide, and this is where freedom to mix came in, how they wanted to deploy those forces. The United States has always preferred the submarine force. We are, as I always say, a great naval power. We're protected by two oceans. We have the ability to put a lot of warheads at sea. We've tended to build very, very capable submarines and very capable sea-launched ballistic missiles. Very accurate, sea-launched ballistic missiles. The Soviets, by contrast, they're a great land power and always have been. They have depended more on intercontinental ballistic missiles, land-based, both fixed and also mobile. We've basically decided over time that we should essentially let each side enjoy their preferences. We focus more on sea-based systems. They focus more on land-based systems. As long as there's parity between the two sides, one side doesn't jump up in numbers above the other, then that has been fine. Nowadays, when I think about freedom to mix and warheads, I see it in the way we treat our reserve warhead force.

The Russians keep a lot of warheads in non-deployed status, basically assigned to the mission of providing them theater nuclear capability or non-strategic nuclear capability in the horrible event that they thought they ever had to use nuclear weapons. We used to call them tac-nukes. Now we call them non-strategic nuclear weapons. But essentially they focus on being able to deploy warheads to those non-strategic missions in regional theaters. For the United States, when we think about our reserves of warheads, we think about, yes, there's some extended nuclear deterrence provision both for the Europeans and our Asian allies, but in essence, the great bulk of our warheads held in reserve would be available for our strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and so that's where I say if we build uploadable new missiles, then we'll have those warhead systems in reserve to upload on them.

Amy Nelson:

Terrific. Thank you. So I'm hearing flexibility and predictability are really the-

Rose Gottemoeller:

Those are the watchwords.

Amy Nelson:

Priorities right now. Wonderful. I want to ask you about the New START ratification process. It is arguably most famous for the grand bargain, the modernization program in exchange for ratification. And also, maybe this is just for me, the stories of how you basically went door to door to sell the treaty to constituents to get their representatives in favor. Could you talk about the ratification process or any aspects that you want to share?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Yes. Very eager to do so. I always joke that people ask me all the time, who was it more difficult to negotiate with, the Senate or the Russians? And I think it's a kind of 50-50. I can't really say. But it was a very, very, I would say, honest and good ratification process. And it started with the Republican leadership on Capitol Hill being willing ... And at that time, the Democrats were in the majority in the Senate, a slim majority, but still in the majority and the Republicans in the minority. But they were given the go-ahead to vote their conscience. And that was all important.

At the time, Senator Richard Lugar was really such a moral force in the Senate, and they were, on his behest because he felt so strongly about the necessity of having a new treaty in force to replace START ... In fact, there was a bipartisan consensus. And those senators on the Republican side of the aisle could vote their conscience. From the outset, Dick Lugar always said to us, "The votes are there. The senators may not put up their hand and say they're ready to vote, but the votes are there."

There were so many people saying to me, including from inside the administration, "You'll never get the Republican votes. You'll never get them. You'll never get them." But it was very, very valuable that Lugar was absolutely confident, and he knew we could get the votes. That I think was an important going in basic situation that was there. And early on, we knew that Senator Isakson was willing to vote for the treaty, and Senator Bob Corker was willing to vote for the treaty. They came out early. We knew we had three senators anyway, but we had to get some more.

We did work very, very hard in many different ways to get those senators on board. I would say that we had the help of the churches. That was all important. The American Catholic bishops were very important in pushing their constituents, including some bishops in Washington being willing to go up on Capitol Hill and talk to the senators and staffers there. We found one senator was willing to vote for the treaty because his Methodist minister said, "You should vote for this treaty." We could see the importance of the churches in this role. We started things like postcard campaigns, trying to get preachers to say from their pulpits ... And by the way, the Southern Baptists surprisingly were very supportive, the Southern Baptists as well. Getting the preachers to say, "Start sending in postcards. Start calling your senators' offices. Tell them you want them to vote for the treaty."

We really worked hard on that. We also worked hard on a regional basis. We went out, for example, the Des Moines Register. I knew that the Des Moines Register was part of a regional network of newspapers that if we could get the Des Moines Register to endorse the treaty and put it on their editorial page, it would be picked up throughout the region in the Midwest, and we'd get a lot of good looks. I went out to talk to the Des Moines Register editorial board, and boy were they tough. Very knowledgeable about nuclear policy overall. They prepared for the interview. They asked me very tough questions. They wanted to know all about the treaty and how I saw it serving strategic stability. And then in the end of the day, I was nervous, but they did endorse the treaty on their editorial page, and it did get picked up throughout the region.

It's actions like that that were very, very important. And I spent a lot of time working with the media as well. One little vignette I always like to tell is I went on C-SPAN one Sunday morning for their Sunday morning call-in show, and some guy called in from Virginia and said, "Well, I don't know if I want to support this treaty. Is it going to get in the way of my gun rights under the Constitution?" And I was very tempted to smile and say, "Well, unless you have an ICBM in your backyard, I don't think this is going to get in the way of your gun rights." But I answered him in a very straightforward way. I said, "No, this doesn't deal with your constitutional rights to carry guns. It has to do with our strategic nuclear, very large missile systems that are controlled by the federal government." But that was just an example of trying to talk to the public about this as well.

Amy Nelson:

And your famous negotiator's even temperament.

Rose Gottemoeller:

Well, I would just like to say also, it wasn't only the leaders like the American Catholic Bishops, but the groups like the various religious groups. I had many sisters, many nuns coming on calls

with me or the various advocacy groups throughout the community coming on calls with me to talk to me about the treaty and supporting as well. There was a very, very grassroots aspect to it. And I want to say one thing in giving tribute to one person, and that is Terry Lodge. She was a secret weapon for this ratification process. And I would highly recommend you also talk to her in this series of interviews because she was very, very experienced at ratification. She had worked on getting the Chemical Weapons Convention across the finish line. She had worked on some of the earlier nuclear arms control treaties like START. And she had also engaged very deeply in the failed attempt to get the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty across the finish line. She was very experienced, and she knew that we had to reach out in all these directions and do all this grassroots work and go to the media as much as we could across the country, talk to the American bishops till we were blue in the face. She knew we really had to work hard to get this done. And I think when I see people attempting ratification today, I just think, well, people have given up.

But in other things I watched, for example, trying to get the disabilities treaty across the finish line, they were not pounding the pavement in the same way we were. And you just have to put in that time. It's retail work, it's hard work, and it takes a lot of time and effort. And I must say the last thing I'll just focus on is that we made ourselves available to the senators and their staff 24/7, and I was up on Capitol Hill all the time, briefing senators and their staffs about the treaty. Any question they had, we had a tiger team essentially.

Amy Nelson:

Alex Bell was your liaison to the Hill at the time, right?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Yeah, Alex Bell was there, but also my core team who were senior people on my negotiation. Mike Elliott from the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time. Ted Warner, who's since left us, but very important on the OSD side. Jim Miller was involved. Mike Mullen himself as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would come up from time to time. It was a full court press with the interagency helping too.

Amy Nelson:

Fantastic. And do you think that was the last time, cynically speaking, the American people cared about arms control and nuclear weapons?

Rose Gottemoeller:

That's a good question. I think they care about it on an episodic basis when it's brought to their attention. There was a lot of attention two summers ago when the Oppenheimer film came out. I thought that film failed because it did not address enough the horrors of nuclear war. But nevertheless, there was a burst of interest in that moment. There's a new film coming out that you may know.

Amy Nelson:

Kathryn Bigelow. Yeah.

Rose Gottemoeller:

And I hope that that will create new interest again. I have to say among my students here at Stanford, and I'm seeing that at other universities where I do lectures, there is more interest among the younger generation. I hope that we can nurture and develop that now.

Amy Nelson:

That's great. Thank you. I want to ask you about NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, adaptation of the current strategic context, the role of NATO going forward. Anything else on NATO you want to add?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Thank you very much.

Amy Nelson:

And then we can move to some final reflections.

Rose Gottemoeller:

Right. Perhaps I'll just mention one other thing that I think is important for those contemplating ratification processes in the future. So if we could return to that for one moment.

Amy Nelson:

Absolutely. Anything else you want to add about the ratification process of New START and lessons learned?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Yes, absolutely, and I do want to mention the very serious and important discussions we had with the Mormon elders with the Mormon church in Salt Lake City. The Mormons, as you may recollect, were very involved in the MX debate back in the 1980s, and at the time they were disappointed in the outcome of that debate. I won't go into all the details here, but for us, we were hopeful that they would be supportive of the treaty because there are such a big Mormon caucus on Capitol Hill, both in the Senate and the House. And we thought it would be important to have the Mormon church on board with regard to supporting the treaty, but they were very clear that they do not as a matter of church policy, either speak up pro or con regarding matters of nuclear weapons policy or deterrence because they felt that back during the MX debate, they got too far forward and then they were not happy with the outcome the way it unfolded.

I think they were happy with the outcome that it wasn't going to be deployed, the racetrack wasn't going to be deployed in Utah, but the way it all unfolded, I think for them meant that they have put in place a very firm stricture now against opining on these matters. I think it is very important to continue to engage and involve them in talking about these matters, but it's not, I think, at this time possible to see them actually participate in endorsing a treaty, for example.

Amy Nelson:

Great. Thank you. I want to ask you about perspective on NATO from your vantage point during your position there. NATO of course, is fundamentally a nuclear alliance. How do you assess NATO's current nuclear sharing arrangements? Are they fit for purpose today? Should they be adapted? What are your thoughts?

Rose Gottemoeller:

They are definitely fit for purpose today. NATO's nuclear sharing infrastructure has been greatly modernized in the last few years. There's been a huge investment in the infrastructure. Very, very important modernization process has gone on at the bases. And frankly, that was not the case just 10 years ago when I arrived as the NATO Deputy Secretary General in 2016. Frankly, there were

a lot of concerns about NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. There were questions about the B61-12, whether the warhead modernization would proceed and be completed on a timely basis. There were concerns about the age of the infrastructure, the storage facilities at the basing countries' bases. And there were very great concerns about the dual capable aircraft and whether all of the basing countries would buy the F-35 and pay the extra money that costs to get them certified as dual capable, capable of the nuclear mission.

All of these questions were swirling throughout the three years when I was at NATO as the Deputy Secretary General. But to their credit, the Trump administration carried forward the modernization decisions that had been made in the Obama administration. They sank money into upgrading and improving the infrastructure at the basing sites, number one, and number two, the DOE NNSA placed great emphasis on completing the modernization and deployment of the B61-12, the modernized warhead that goes into the European sites. I'm very pleased that now all of those warheads have been deployed, the site upgrades have been completed, and most importantly, the basing countries have all made a decision now to acquire the F-35 and to pay for its dual capability.

When I was there, the Germans were still arguing that somehow they were going to continue to hold onto the Tornados which are falling apart. So they could not get the political courage to make that big decision about buying the F-35. Again, it was Trump who pushed that in his first term in office, but I always say it's Vladimir Putin with his egregious second invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that brought all of the allies then to a firm conviction that they had to up their investments, including in things like the F-35 for the nuclear sharing arrangements.

Amy Nelson:

Yeah. A big about-face for those Germans. The big Zeitenwende.

Rose Gottemoeller:

Exactly, exactly.

Amy Nelson:

Was that-

Rose Gottemoeller:

That said, if I may, I'll just comment a moment further that the big problem now I think is the lack of confidence in the Trump administration and in the president's willingness to make that critical decision should the terrible moment come when nuclear weapons would have to be contemplated in the European theater. Because of the way the president and his team have been on again, off again in supporting NATO, there is now a crisis of confidence, I think, in the presidential decision-making around the extended nuclear deterrent. And that is a very important issue. I hope and expect, frankly, the administration to begin to opine in a declaratory way on this to try to restore some of that confidence. I hope that will be the case. But in the meantime, I do like to stress that the infrastructure itself is fit for purpose and the European allies are totally committed to that extended deterrence mission in NATO now.

Amy Nelson:

Interesting. And do you think that imposed crisis of confidence was by design, or do you think it was an accident?

Rose Gottemoeller:

It's very difficult to say. This president is an expert in trying to keep people off balance, allies off balance, other countries off balance with uncertainty. It's part of his M.O. I frankly don't think that it was foreseen the implications for the extended nuclear deterrence mission. I do think it's important that the other two nuclear powers in NATO, France and the UK, have stepped forward now with certain steps of their own to try to bolster that extended deterrence confidence. We'll just have to see how these dynamics develop. But I do hope and expect that Washington will reiterate and reemphasize its extended nuclear deterrence declaratory policy.

Amy Nelson:

And do you think this crisis of confidence could result in a greater number of nuclear weapon states?

Rose Gottemoeller:

I hope not. That's why I'm hoping that the Washington crowd will see that it's important for them to reiterate and reemphasize that extended deterrence mission. We don't want to see our allies either in Asia or in Europe thinking that they have to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. For one thing, it's a waste of money. It's a big expensive price tag item. And number two, the effect on the nonproliferation regime will be extraordinarily damaging. It could mean the end of the nonproliferation treaty regime, and after that, Katie bar the door. It's not in our strategic interest to see a wide-ranging proliferation of nuclear-armed countries around the world.

Amy Nelson:

Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the NPT?

Rose Gottemoeller:

At the moment, I continue to be optimistic just because I think it is so ingrained in national psyches up to this point, but it has suffered from neglect in recent years, neglect of high-level attention. I saw that as undersecretary in the review conference in 2015 attention in Washington was focused elsewhere. Albeit Mr. Obama was very much with his Prague Initiative focused on nuclear weapons policy. But nevertheless, we didn't get a lot of support, I would say, in New York as we were trying to push things through at that time. There's a kind of lack of attention, a kind of neglect at high levels that I would like to see remedied.

Amy Nelson:

Ambassador Gottemoeller, what are you proudest of in your career?

Rose Gottemoeller:

By the way, I'm not an ambassador. I've never been confirmed as an ambassador. I've been confirmed as an undersecretary and as an assistant secretary twice, once in DOE and once in State, but never as an ambassador. That's always an important point. Ambassadors like to preserve that unique title for themselves.

Amy Nelson:

My apologies. Undersecretary, deputy secretary-general.

Rose Gottemoeller:

Rose.

Amy Nelson:

Rose. He'll edit that out, right?

Rose Gottemoeller:

No, that's fine. I don't actually mind if you leave it in.

Amy Nelson:

I thought you just got the title as an honorific no matter what.

Rose Gottemoeller:

No.

Amy Nelson:

No. Okay.

Rose Gottemoeller:

It's hard for me to say what I'm most proud of because I've been privileged in my career to have so many wonderful, wonderful experiences. I think in the end of the day, at the moment, I'm most proud of having got the New START Treaty across the finish line, both in negotiation with the Russians and in also working to get advice and consent of the Senate. But I have to say too, I'm very proud of now having been at Stanford for five years, very proud of being able to nurture and mentor the next generations coming up, and to see their interest piqued and to try to make sure that our next generation is populated so that there will be people willing to wrestle with these different and difficult problems of nuclear proliferation and indeed nuclear weapons policy overall. I think the presence of nuclear deterrence in the world is a reality, and we may not like it, but as long as nuclear weapons exist, as President Obama always said, we have to maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal.

Amy Nelson:

Wonderful. And what do you most hope to impart on the next generation?

Rose Gottemoeller:

Don't give up.

Amy Nelson:

Persist.

Rose Gottemoeller:

Never give up. And also nowadays, and I feel it especially here at Stanford, the implications of new technological developments are going to drive many different threats in the weapons mass destruction realm, not only in the nuclear realm, but also on the biological and chemical sides as well. Our new generation has to be alert to the emergence of these new threats and has to be thinking very imaginatively about how to control these threats, how to control the weapons that may emerge and think through what are going to be very, very difficult challenges because in nuclear arms control to this point, we've emphasized our priority has been placing limits on hardware, items of account, and items of control that are easy to see even from outer space. When

we're talking about new developments that very much involve software, they're going to be much more difficult to control and constrain.

Amy Nelson:

Yeah. Wonderful. Thank you so much. It's been a pleasure speaking with you today.

Rose Gottemoeller:

It's been a pleasure talking to you, Amy. Thank you very, very much.